Responding to Catastrophes

U.S. Innovation in a Vulnerable World

A Report of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project

Project Codirectors
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Lead Author
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PREFACE

Humanitarian crises pose an urgent challenge to policymakers. Some in the policy community may dismiss humanitarian response as—at best—an addendum to more traditional security concerns, yet the potential effects of these crises are daunting. The prospect of a terrorist attack in New York being closely followed by a hurricane in Houston and an earthquake in Los Angeles, for example, is far from unreasonable, and it is frightening to consider the consequences such a scenario would have on the U.S. government both at home and abroad. It is essential that decision-makers in the United States begin to grapple as seriously with crisis management as they would with other security issues, which will require greater U.S. engagement on international catastrophe response.

As a world leader, the United States has a serious interest in the effective management of humanitarian crises. Strong crisis management supports larger U.S. goals for global security, and in cases where the United States takes a visible leadership role, it can significantly bolster American prestige.[1] In addition, effective humanitarian response is consistent with American values and provides the United States with an opportunity to balance realpolitik with international goodwill.

Despite these opportunities, the United States often fails to coordinate crisis management effectively with international counterparts. This tendency is at least partially driven by a perception that international response mechanisms are burdened by chronic failures, as well as an occasional ignorance of the architecture of global crisis management among U.S. nongovernment response groups.

Yet the global humanitarian community offers enormous resources to international emergencies, and a greater integration of U.S. and international efforts could significantly improve international crisis management. The United States has neither the will nor the capacity to manage every humanitarian crisis around the world, and the best strategy for enhancing American disaster risk management is to improve the existing global structures, as well as adjust U.S. involvement in those structures.

The extraordinary current of innovation in American life offers initial solutions to some of the more intractable problems in crisis response. By looking to nontraditional humanitarian partners, such as the private sector and the military, the United States would be well positioned to lead reforms in global crisis management. New partnerships could significantly improve services for the vulnerable and support wider U.S. objectives by boosting American prestige.

With such objectives in mind, a more proactive U.S. role in global humanitarian response is required, particularly as the nature of humanitarian crises is becoming more complex and their

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1. This effect was demonstrated in both Indonesia and Pakistan—both critical countries in the Global War on Terror—following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and the Kashmir earthquake in 2005. Increases in positive public opinion were not sustained, however.

potential impact more devastating.[2] In one recent study commissioned by the British government, for example, it was projected that humanitarian crises will directly affect more than 129 million people over the next ten years in Central Asia, South Asia, and East and Southern Africa.[3] This represents an alarming increase in both the incidence and severity of crises, and the growing likelihood of impact on industrialized countries should be even more worrisome for U.S. policymakers.[4]

Emergencies of the future will increasingly be the result of *synchronous failures*, in which humanitarian crises result from simultaneous systems failures, such as massive floods rupturing toxic waste stores, leading to public panic, major health problems, and possible rioting. Such crises have a greater likelihood of cascading into one another, with a single disaster agent triggering a series of related "spin-off" emergencies.

As crises begin to feed off of each other, disaster agents[5] will expand to encompass nuclear seepage, climate change, IT failures, pandemics, urban decay, and resource conflicts, among others. Although the possible combinations of new and traditional threats are considerable, the enhanced ability of emergencies to transcend political and socioeconomic barriers will be the most daunting factor Faced with increasingly complex threats, the United States must work with international partners to strengthen global facilities for crisis risk management, improve existing response structures, and integrate innovative practices from outside the traditional humanitarian community.

This Study in Context

Numerous organizations, research institutions, and scholars have identified the challenges for future humanitarian action.[6] This study largely accepts their findings and begins with the assumption that future threats have the potential to wreak devastation on vast numbers of people and their livelihoods. *Responding to Catastrophes: U.S. Innovation in a Vulnerable World* seeks

2. Feinstein International Famine Center, *Ambiguity and Change: Humanitarian NGOs Prepare for the Future* (Medford, MA: Tufts University, November 2004).

3. Humanitarian Futures Programme, *Dimensions of Crisis Impacts: Humanitarian Needs by 2015* (London: Kings CollegeLondon, for the Department for International Development, January 2007).

4. There are numerous recent examples of crises having serious or potentially serious impacts on developed states. Hurricane Katrina provides a compelling case in the United States. In the United Kingdom, floods in summer 2007 overwhelmed local response capacities thoroughly enough to warrant a government review of the "humanitarian disaster" (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6961502.stm). Finally, in Japan, a July 2007 earthquake caused a fire at the world's largest nuclear power complex, damaging one reactor and spilling water used to cool radioactive rods into the sea (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/16/AR2007071601712.html).

5. A disaster agent is the cause of a crisis, such as a hurricane, war, locusts leading to famine, and so forth.

6. Initiatives in this area are diverse, including the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Humanitarian Reform program (see www.humanitarianreform.org). Other major works include Publications of the Humanitarian Futures Programme (see http://www.humanitarianfutures.org); Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) annual reviews; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Antonio Donini, Larry Minear, et al., *Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Principles, Power, and Perceptions* (Boston: Tufts University, 2006); Mark Dalton, Karin von Hippel, et al., *Changes in Humanitarian Financing: Implications for the United Nations* (Geneva: UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, 2003); publications of Hugo Slim at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, (see http://www.hdcentre.org/Hugo%20Publications), among others.

to advance this discussion by developing strategies for U.S. contributions to and U.S. engagement in crisis management, with a special focus on possible contributions from nontraditional responders.

The study examines the current shortcomings in humanitarian response to identify the best opportunities for U.S. engagement and investigates the most useful role for the private sector and the military in addressing these shortcomings. The creative capacity of the United States is at the center of this study, particularly in devising strategies to move innovations into the humanitarian mainstream.

Chapter 1, "Humanitarian Challenges and Innovations," examines present gaps in humanitarian response, particularly in light of emerging threats. This chapter represents the opinions of the wider humanitarian community and gives particular attention to the issues that practitioners identified as the most important. As a result, chapter 1 indicates the extent to which organizations are preparing for future crises and which areas they believe deserve the most attention. More information on the five major gaps in humanitarian response is provided in appendix A.

One major potential source of innovation for humanitarian practice can be found in the business community. The U.S. innovative spirit has fostered one of the world's most dynamic private sectors, and part of this energy can be marshaled to address humanitarian crises. As a rich source of resources, expertise, and innovation, the private sector could significantly influence the efficacy of response operations. Potential contributions are explored in chapter 2, "The Corporate Sector, Humanitarian Response, and Innovation."

In general, the U.S. corporate sector has assumed a larger role in humanitarian response, with a particularly marked jump since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This role often remains purely philanthropic (e.g., donating money to response agencies), although corporate approaches increasingly reflect core business competencies, as well.

Given its enormous resources, the corporate sector could have an immense impact on humanitarian response. Chapter 2 explores this potential while addressing some of the major concerns regarding private sector participation in humanitarian response. These concerns typically fall into three categories:

- corporate motivations and their consistency with humanitarian principles,
- the sustainability of corporate participation, and
- the applicability of corporate solutions to future humanitarian challenges.

These issues are also relevant to the question of military contributions to humanitarian response, which is explored in chapter 3, "Military Support, Capacities, and Intervention." The U.S. military has found itself increasingly engaged in a range of "humanitarian" activities, and Department of Defense (DOD) policies have recently begun to reflect a more robust commitment to the issue.

Many observers remain uneasy with the military's role, but humanitarian crises increasingly constitute important aspects of traditional military objectives. For example, in particularly unstable countries, such as Afghanistan, the military is often the only player with the capacity to access civilian victims of both conflict and natural disasters. These situations have turned the military into a de facto provider of humanitarian assistance.

Whereas the appropriateness of military participation in humanitarian response has long been a topic of debate in humanitarian circles, the question of precisely how the military could enhance crisis management capacity deserves further analysis. As chapter 3 suggests, specific military

capabilities (particularly in planning, management, logistics, and communications) are especially relevant to the operational imperatives of major crises.

Inevitably, some within the humanitarian sector will protest any expansion of the military's involvement in the principled realm of humanitarianism. But the military irrefutably offers certain innovations—attitudinal as well as operational—that must be considered when assessing the appropriateness of its role in crisis management. Chapter 3 highlights some of these innovations and sets out a guide for translating them into humanitarian practice.

After considering the possible contributions of the military and the private sector, the study will examine how the approaches described in chapters 2 and 3 can be applied to the major current gaps in crisis management. Chapter 4, "The Challenges of Innovation," will address this issue, as well as outline ways in which innovation could go beyond "closing gaps" and transform some of the fundamental aspects of response, including the more effective use of technology, changes to response processes, and alterations to the structure of the response system itself.

The private sector and the military both offer important potential contributions, but one of the most significant challenges will be implementing changes across a diverse community that is often resistant to reform. Although it is clear that global humanitarian assistance could benefit from the innovative capacities of U.S. public and private institutions, the humanitarian sector must be committed to the reform process to derive any benefits from U.S. engagement.

Embracing change can be challenging for individuals, and it is often an enormously difficult task for organizations—particularly for a loose-knit amalgam of organizations such as the humanitarian sector. U.S. leadership on an innovation-driven agenda for change could make significant progress in encouraging the humanitarian sector to embrace innovations and nontraditional partners. Strategies for achieving such a policy climate occupy a large portion of the study's focus in chapter 4, as well as a draft National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) in appendix B.

The final three chapters (5, 6 and 7) offer several key recommendations, institutional reforms necessary to implement the recommendations, and concluding remarks about the way ahead.

Methodology

Responding to Catastrophes reflects the outcome of two major research approaches: desktop research and practitioner interviews. The desk research included a wide review of scholarly articles, as well as numerous reports, evaluations, and strategy documents commissioned by humanitarian organizations, governments, and research institutions. Appendix C presents an indicative bibliography.

The backbone of the project's research comes from over 200 practitioner interviews and a series of roundtable meetings. The wide range of participants allowed the study to reflect the mood of many in the humanitarian sector (principally from the U.S. government, multilateral, nongovernmental, and research organizations) regarding the challenges of the future and strategies for confronting them.

Humanitarian practitioners also provided perspectives that guided subsequent interviews with representatives from the corporate and military sectors, primarily from the United States, about their respective contributions to humanitarian response. Interviews were not for individual attribution in order to encourage frankness in discussion, and a full list of consulted offices can be found in appendix D, following the bibliography.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation. We are particularly grateful to Dr. Marin Strmecki, Allan Song, and Dr. Nadia Schadlow for their guidance. The Carnegie Corporation of New York also contributed to this project and report, and special thanks go to Stephen Del Rosso for his wise counsel and continued support.

Much of the methodology of this study relied on practitioner interviews, and the authors would like to thank the numerous professionals who took time from their busy schedules to discuss humanitarian response. In particular, we would like to thank the U.S. Embassy in Geneva for hosting a roundtable meeting, as well as a number of participants who generously agreed to review drafts of the final report.

The PCR Project is grateful for the assistance of its staff in preparing the final version of the report, as well as to the staff at the Humanitarian Futures Programme, King's College London, for additional assistance. Excellent leadership at CSIS and King's College London made this study possible, and the authors are thankful for both.

The content and judgments made in this report are solely those of the authors and the project directors.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The incidence and severity of catastrophes around the world are growing. The United States needs to prioritize and focus its response efforts and take a more robust role in catastrophe management to safeguard U.S. interests and promote global stability.

Policymakers have often resisted calls to give greater attention to humanitarian response, although emerging trends in global catastrophes should make that attitude increasingly perilous. At home, it is not difficult to conceive of possible scenarios that could paralyze the United States: a terrorist attack in New York closely followed by a hurricane in Houston and an earthquake in Los Angeles, for example. Overseas, potential crises could also severely affect the United States and its allies. In the seismically active Ferghana Valley of Central Asia, for instance, an earthquake could rupture thousands of tons of poorly stored nuclear waste, a legacy of Soviet-era uranium mines. The consequences of such an event could easily exacerbate long-standing ethnic tensions, sparking both intra- and interstate conflict and possibly affecting U.S. relations with states that are key to American objectives in Afghanistan.

In short, humanitarian management should be recognized as an issue that speaks to core interests and values of the United States. The ability—and, increasingly, the propensity—of "natural" disasters to cascade into "complex emergencies" underlines why it is inappropriate to separate "natural" from "man-made" disasters in discussions of global crises. Although many believe that governments cannot be held responsible for "acts of God," in reality, the converse is true.

Human decisions frequently exacerbate the effects of disaster agents, as earthquakes, for example, tear through areas that either should not have been populated in the first place or should have been retrofitted once the area's vulnerability became clear. In this sense, all disasters are "man-made," and the dichotomy between acts of war and acts of God is largely false. Unfortunately, catastrophe response organizations—both within the United States and abroad—mostly have not incorporated this thinking into practice.

On the other hand, evidence shows that humanitarian assistance in general has gained greater traction within the U.S. government (see figure 1). U.S. and international policymakers are indeed increasingly aware that more work is needed on these issues, but this has not yet translated into a clear direction.

Responding to Catastrophes: U.S. Innovation in a Vulnerable World seeks to integrate thinking on the nature of future catastrophes into the policymaker's decisionmaking process. The study is based on four main assumptions:

- Future humanitarian crises will be much more complex than those of the past;
- A range of scientific, social, and technological innovations could offset the impact of future crises. Many of these innovations can be found outside the traditional humanitarian sector, particularly within the corporate sector and the military;
- Significant shifts in conceptions of "humanitarianism" and changes to the existing international

Figure ES.1. Total U.S. Spending on Humanitarian Assistance



Source: Adapted from Rhoda Margesson et al., *International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 2007).

humanitarian architecture must take place in order to capture the full potential of innovation for crisis management; and

- The United States is well placed to drive the necessary changes in humanitarian mechanisms.

Responding to Catastrophes examines the major shortcomings in humanitarian response as it presently exists in order to identify areas where U.S. leadership could have the most significant impact. Five major weaknesses were found in the course of research and practitioner interviews, and two were identified as being particularly relevant to U.S. engagement:

- ***Strategic planning*** capabilities within the humanitarian sector are often poor, with organizations frequently planning for what they are capable of, rather than for what may actually be needed. Leveraging the experiences of the U.S. military and the corporate sector into humanitarian practice could make a tremendous contribution. Humanitarian practitioners are open to focusing more energy on strategic planning, agreeing that the current weak institutional interest is mostly driven by a lack of dedicated funding.
- ***Operational coherence*** is a problem in many response operations, mostly due to rapidly evolving conditions and a high diversity of actors with poor central leadership. Humanitarians could be better informed by private-sector and military experiences coordinating complex operations in complicated environments. In addition, active leadership by the United States to recast the international response architecture could spur a greater sense of common purpose across the humanitarian sector, which might put an end to a variety of dysfunctional practices among bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental organizations.

Responding to Catastrophes: U.S. Innovation in a Vulnerable World proposes that the military and the corporate sector can play an important—even essential—role in crisis management, but only if they undertake this role in a considered and balanced way.

Indeed, the *corporate sector* has become more involved in catastrophe management in recent years. American businesses, in particular, have been global leaders in corporate giving to humanitarian response. What is less certain—by many companies' own admission—is precisely how deep this commitment runs and what direction it will take. Some corporations in the United States, for example, have shifted their attention to a domestic focus on humanitarian response, a result of the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina. This shift gives some support to the argument that

companies will mostly limit their contributions to areas where they have an immediate business interest, which undercuts their usefulness in the eyes of many humanitarians. Even if this limitation is true, however, three facts stand out:

- Given the increasing reach of global emergencies, the role of the corporate sector is likely to increase. Collaborating with the humanitarian sector will help corporations become "smarter" about managing catastrophes, and their resources and expertise can likewise act as a "force multiplier" for humanitarians.
- Certain corporate practices can have a positive influence on humanitarian practice, irrespective of whether corporations actually participate in response. Corporate expertise in areas such as program management, logistics/distribution, and strategic planning could all make important contributions for humanitarians.
- A growing number of corporate enterprises have demonstrated their interest in responding to catastrophes, particularly when humanitarians have a defined role for them and when there is senior-level encouragement of the corporate role. The U.S. government could encourage the trend of corporate involvement as well as provide acceptable incentives.

The policy framework surrounding military participation in humanitarian response points toward a less ambiguous embrace of humanitarian issues. The military has long played a critical role in humanitarian response, and it is currently dedicating greater financial resources to and higher-level policy interest in an expanded role (driven at least partially by U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq). Short-term gains in public opinion toward the United States in Indonesia and Pakistan have also illustrated the political dividends that can accrue in strategically important states following successful humanitarian operations.[1]

Although some humanitarians are concerned about a larger role for the military, the military offers potential assets to humanitarian response, including expertise on operating in difficult environments and organizing operations. Another important area is military research, where numerous projects could be adapted to humanitarian purposes.

The main challenge for the United States is how to bring these communities together in ways that will allow them to build on each other's strengths, without sacrificing their independence. This study offers *five main recommendations* to refashion international response mechanisms and *prioritize crisis management* within the government.

- Create a deputy national security adviser for humanitarian response who can work across institutional lines in the United States to unify and prioritize American approaches to catastrophes, both at home and abroad.
- Advocate for the creation of structures at the United Nations related to humanitarian response that will be more agile and provide for better "futures planning." This includes:
  - Creation of an integrated early warning system that aggregates existing models;
  - Advance planning on roles and responsibilities for future responses in areas of pre-identified vulnerability ("RRR Matrix");
  - Creation of a virtual warehouse that catalogues relief supplies around the world and is accessible to *all* response actors;

1. In both countries, however, the increase was not sustained over the longer term.

Figure ES.2. Fostering Collaborative Innovation



  - Creation of a dedicated global research forum that can address outstanding issues of humanitarian response impartially and that includes a wide range of actors.

- Advocate for a shift in the role of the United Nations that focuses on monitoring and evaluation rather than operations.

Many of these suggestions center on innovations that would facilitate operational proximity among the three concerned sectors: humanitarian, corporate, and military. They require an approach focused on more open-sourced, network-driven organizational alignments, or *"collaboration pools,"* which will require cultural changes within each sector. Bringing the full strength of each community to bear on response is also about avoiding the bureaucratic obstacles that often undermine attempts at change.

At the heart of this study's approach is the idea that each sector has unique and innovative expertise and practices. In order for these innovations to be harnessed as widely as possible, a spirit of collaboration must prevail across sectors. The United States can best enhance international disaster risk management by fostering this sense of collaborative innovation[2] (see figure 2) and promoting it both domestically and at the international level.

2. Many thanks to Guy Ben Ari, Center for Strategic and International Studies, for his assistance in refining this term and the accompanying diagram.

1 HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES AND INNOVATIONS

Over the years, humanitarian organizations have been largely unsuccessful in resolving some of the major issues that complicate crisis response, despite general awareness about recurrent obstacles (see, for example, the numerous "lessons-learned" exercises).[1] Yet many of these shortcomings continue to undermine response effectiveness, and as the dynamics of crisis evolve in unforeseen ways, persistent gaps and emerging challenges will render humanitarian organizations increasingly unprepared to address future crises.

Crisis management was originally built around limited notions of "response" that required the quick exit of relief workers at the end of the "emergency" phase of a crisis.[2] Although there have been concentrated efforts to revise this approach, a reactive ethos still characterizes much of the humanitarian sector. This ethos, combined with the diversity of humanitarian actors, has contributed to the sector's inability to confront long-standing problems, as well as to a perceived resistance to innovation. In order to confront human vulnerability more fully, the sector must embrace innovation and engage with nontraditional responders who offer wider skill sets.

In laying the foundation for constructive U.S. engagement, this chapter discusses the most urgent gaps in humanitarian response as identified by a broad sample of experienced practitioners. The overarching objective is to aggregate perceived individual obstacles into general shortcomings, so that they can be addressed more comprehensively. Chapter 1 represents a condensed description of the major gaps in humanitarian response as outlined in practitioner interviews and research. Greater detail regarding each gap is available in appendix A.

Persistent Response Gaps

Humanitarian response has developed significantly over the past three decades. In general, humanitarian operations have become more professional, and response operations today are a far cry from the mostly ad hoc adventures of previous years. Still, heightened professionalism has arguably resulted in the emergence of a closed "humanitarian enterprise."[3] As a result, the community often appears self-referential, determining internally whether a response program was successful

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1. ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) conducts annual humanitarian response reviews that focus on lessons learned (see http://www.odi.org.uk/ALNAP/publications/rha.htm). The recent Tsunami Evaluation Coalition report was a comprehensive effort facilitated by ALNAP that details many of the common problems in humanitarian response, as experienced during the massive tsunami relief operation (see http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org).

2. This attitude has been characterized as the "OFDA ethos," reflecting what USAID's Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance feels should be a response-oriented and short-term role. Many within OFDA feel that there is no adequately funded "hand-over mechanism" in the USAID repertoire, however, and it is also increasingly difficult to determine when a humanitarian crisis comes to an "end."

3. Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, *The Quality of Money: Donor Behavior in Humanitarian Financing* (Medford, MA: Tufts University Feinstein International Famine Center, 2003).

Figure 1.1. Strengths of Humanitarian Response



Figure 1.2. Weaknesses in Humanitarian Response



as well as which follow-up activities, if any, are appropriate. These discussions, debates, and analyses often appear incomprehensible to the lay public, including government officials peripherally involved in monitoring or financing operations.

This professionalism has at times encouraged a disproportionate focus on standards at the expense of ongoing creativity and innovation in programming.[4] The resultant inability to accommodate innovation across the community constitutes one of the major stumbling blocks to the resolution of persistent problems in crisis management.

4. Several examples of standards exist in the humanitarian sector, the most well known being the Sphere standards. Launched in 1997, the Sphere Project is supported by a consortium of NGOs and the ICRC/IFRC (International Committee of the Red Cross/International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). The standards are controversial in practice (see Ruth Gidley, "Critics find fault with Sphere standards for relief work," Reuters AlertNet, October 15, 2004, http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/109783801066.htm). Some practitioners have further cited evidence that Sphere standards for disaster response are occasionally in excess of pre-event conditions in many developing countries (OCHA interview)—a possible example of overprofessionalization.

As figure 1.1 suggests, practitioners largely judge greater professionalism to be a strength, and there is little doubt that professionalization has improved many aspects of response operations. Yet practitioners' impressions of the major weaknesses in humanitarian response (see figure 1.2) reveal a lack of the skills necessary to claim a truly professional capacity.[5]

Research and interviews identified five core gaps in humanitarian response, each of which requires attention if the humanitarian community is to meet future challenges.

Global Perspectives Gap

Major global transformations are underway with the potential to significantly affect future crisis management needs. The humanitarian sector does not appear to have a unified approach to either new humanitarian actors or major global trends.

Humanitarian organizations require a clearer understanding of how their principles fit in the context of global transformations, such as the emergence of nonstate actors in relief (e.g., Hezbollah) or the prospect of major new donors (e.g., China or India).[6] These issues all have the potential to challenge existing principles and practices. Humanitarian organizations may find themselves compelled to examine their values and objectives within the context of major political, demographic, and socio-economic shifts.

These shifts will increasingly include a move away from state-centered strategies, and humanitarian organizations must prepare for a future with fewer formal state structures and more reliance on regional and/or international groupings.

Strategic Planning Gap

Humanitarian operations lack a clear set of end-state objectives. These objectives are essential to guide humanitarian activities, as well as to anticipate emerging trends and future crises.

The reactive ethos that characterizes much of humanitarian response discourages substantive strategic planning. Donor funding patterns can further complicate long-term planning efforts. Few deny the need for prevention and preparedness in crisis management, but strategic planning is often approached within parameters that emphasize existing strengths, rather than seeking to incorporate new thinking or define a practical end-state. This further disincentivizes precrisis planning.

Perhaps more importantly, the lack of strategic planning also leaves many humanitarian organizations unprepared for emerging global vulnerabilities. Although there is wide understanding of the shifts under way in humanitarian threats (see figure 1.3), this awareness cannot be translated into action until strategic planning becomes better integrated into humanitarian practice. Where planning does occur, it too frequently is tailored to what an organization is capable of, rather than to what may actually be needed.

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5. Respondents were universally more vocal in discussing the weaknesses of the present response system than in listing its strengths. Many chose not to name any specific strong points in response operations, and those who did often focused on areas of recent improvement rather than areas of unconditional success.

6. China's recent role in Africa could be indicative of coming shifts in the donor environment. See, for example, Howard W. French and Lydia Polgreen, "China, Filling a Void, Drills for Riches in Chad," *New York Times*, August 13, 2007, sec. A. See also Bates Gill et al., *China's Expanding Role in Africa: Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2007).

Figure 1.3. Future Drivers of Crisis



Operational Coherence Gap

Disjointed innovations, communications gaps, and a lack of program management skills continue to mar operational coherence during response.

The assurance that responders are working toward the same goal with at least a minimum degree of complementarity is essential for ensuring appropriate and timely assistance. The quest for greater operational coherence inspired the UN's recent cluster initiative, which, piloted in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake, organizes thematic response teams around a lead agency in order to consolidate humanitarian efforts.[7] To date, however, the cluster initiative does not include the full spectrum of responders, nor does it include strategies for coordinating intersectoral activities or connecting with relevant national authorities.

Political factors have at times worked against these efforts, particularly in the form of an institutional "survival instinct" that discourages interorganizational collaboration. This instinct, however, is not solely responsible for the logistical, distributional, and informational gaps that result in disjointed response operations. Rather, many of the problems affecting operational coherence derive from the weak humanitarian approach to innovation and the difficulty in standardizing useful practices, indicating poor program management skills.

The end result of low operational coherence is relief operations that are characterized by information being either overly compartmentalized or entirely unavailable, and a lack of awareness of individual organizations' comparative advantages.

7. The cluster initiative is relatively new and has been the focus of both positive and negative reactions. In Pakistan, where the approach was piloted after the 2005 earthquake, one report outlined many of the program's shortcomings. See Antonio Donini et al., *The Evolving UN Cluster Approach in the Aftermath of the Pakistan Earthquake: An NGO Perspective* (London: ActionAid, 2006). An internal assessment that reviewed the cluster approach in a variety of operating environments was cautiously more positive and identified areas for further improvement. See Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), OCHA, *IASC Interim Self-Assessment of Implementation of the Cluster Approach in the Field* (November 2006), http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/cluster%20approach%20page/Introduction/IASC%20Interim%20Self%20Assessment.pdf.

Culture Awareness Gap

Humanitarian organizations require better understanding of the people they seek to serve, as well as of nontraditional response partners. Imperfect cultural information blunts response effectiveness and complicates cooperation with actors outside the traditional humanitarian sector.

Despite improvements in assessments and a heightened awareness of cultural issues at the local level, examples of mistargeted or culturally inappropriate aid are common, and the notion of the crisis-affected as "hapless victims" persists. This attitude results in underinvestment in local capacity building, despite strong rhetorical commitments.

Similarly, there is a general reluctance to understand the "culture" of the private sector and the military—both of which are de facto humanitarian assistance providers whose role in future operations is likely to increase.

Community Coherence Gap

The disparate grouping of actors that provide humanitarian assistance can at best be termed a "sector," as they largely lack uniform approaches or beliefs. This affects organizations' abilities to act cooperatively during response operations.

The humanitarian sector mostly lacks the characteristics of a unified system, despite the existence of organizational groupings. The standards that do exist enjoy the compliance of a relatively small group of responders, and even these standards are controversial elsewhere within the sector.[8] Humanitarians also lack a recognized authority to provide objective analysis of their impact on crisis-affected populations, such as a community ombudsman.[9] This means that many postoperation evaluations are done "in-house" among a relatively limited grouping of like-minded organizations and that lessons are rarely learned across the sector.

Even those organizations that seem well positioned to take a leadership role have largely been unable to do so. For example, the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which seeks to coordinate UN and nongovernmental humanitarian assistance, has made progress but is still seen as overly exclusive and bureaucratic, even among some UN staff.[10] Without basic agreement on issues such as terminology, it is difficult to make substantial progress in many areas.

8. Three major such initiatives are ALNAP, HAP-International (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership-International), and the Sphere Project. ALNAP is a collective response by the humanitarian sector dedicated to improving humanitarian performance through increased learning and accountability. The mission of HAP-International is to make humanitarian action accountable to its intended beneficiaries through self-regulation, compliance verification, and quality assurance certification. The aim of the Sphere Project is to improve the quality of assistance provided to people affected by disasters and to enhance the accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster response. Controversy surrounds the manner in which the standards were selected, as well as how feasible they are in practice. One interviewee stressed that some Sphere standards for response mandated conditions that did not exist even *before* the crisis. Interview, November 23, 2006.

9. There were some efforts to create an ombudsman in the late 1990s, but those efforts have since stalled. See HAP-International's Humanitarian Ombudsman Project, http://www.hapinternational.org/hap-geneva/OMBUDSMAN/STATEMEN.html. One interviewee qualified the community's failure to embrace this concept as "a tragedy." Interview, November 23, 2006.

10. Correspondence, September 5, 2007.

Moving Forward

The individual gaps in humanitarian assistance can be organized into five major categories: global perspectives, strategic planning, operational coherence, cultural awareness, and community coherence. U.S. policymakers must develop a full understanding of these challenges before designing strategies to ensure that humanitarian responses will be adequate to meet the challenges of the future.

It is important to be aware of what remains to be done, particularly because emerging trends in crisis dynamics threaten to exacerbate the present shortcomings in crisis management. Although it is impossible to craft a single strategy to address all of the issues discussed in this chapter, the subsequent portions of this study, focused on possible private sector and military contributions, will clarify major areas in which "nontraditional" responders can offer assistance. Finally, the study will outline how the U.S. government can best promote structures that will encourage such contributions.

2 THE CORPORATE SECTOR, HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, AND INNOVATION

Corporate sector participation in humanitarian response rose dramatically after the Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, with both crises setting records for corporate cash and in-kind donations. As the incidence and severity of catastrophes intensify, the corporate sector is likely to play an even more active role in crisis management.

Private companies offer considerable expertise to crisis management, and the traditional humanitarian sector should develop strategies for capturing this potential in future operations. Skepticism about corporate sector motivations persists within some quarters of the humanitarian sector. Although it is evident that corporate motivations are by no means solely self-interested, there are legitimate reasons to question the extent of corporate commitment to crisis management—a fact readily recognized by some corporate representatives. Despite some uncertainty, corporate participation—and, more broadly, corporate practices—can significantly enhance the efficacy of crisis management.

The recent momentum around corporate participation has resulted in a range of public, private, and nonprofit organizations engaging with one another under a variety of different arrangements. To date, however, this momentum points in no clear direction, which also fosters skepticism among some humanitarians regarding the goals, consequences, and sustainability of corporate engagement.

This study assumes that if the full capacities of the United States are to be used to meet future humanitarian challenges, the corporate sector—as a source of innovation, resources, and global interests must play a major role. In order to understand the potential contributions of the corporate sector to confronting emerging humanitarian threats, it is important to explore both the major concerns among humanitarians, as well as what the corporate sector can offer. Chapter 2 focuses on four main issues:

- motivations for corporate sector engagement in humanitarian crises;
- types of corporate sector engagement in humanitarian crises;
- sustainability of corporate involvement over the longer term; and
- innovations, humanitarian engagement, and the corporate sector over time.

Chapter 2 examines these issues from the perspectives of the humanitarian and corporate communities, outlining realistic expectations of corporate involvement in crisis management. These expectations should give further insight into some of the objections to corporate participation, as well as an understanding of the corporate sector's own vision of its role.

Motivations for Corporate Sector Engagement in Humanitarian Crises

The motivations ascribed to corporate involvement in humanitarian crises revolve around four general assumptions, ranging from highly cynical ones to euphoric visions of corporate solutions to every problem. One common explanation is that corporate involvement is an extension of public relations, with the overriding objective being simply to gain good press. A second belief holds that corporate involvement can be "good business," as it opens up new opportunities for those with goods and expertise to sell. In some cases, this is limited to familiarizing populations with a particular brand by conspicuously using the label "assistance," although companies specializing in relief-relevant goods may also view response operations as an opportunity to "pilot" their products with affected groups. A third explanation argues that corporate engagement offers a means to protect corporate assets in the face of disasters. A possible implication here is that companies will be highly reluctant to assist in areas that are not immediately relevant to their business interests. Finally, and more optimistically, it has been suggested that corporations increasingly see themselves as part of a changing world order, one in which the corporation has a role to play that transcends "the bottom line."

There are degrees of truth to each of these arguments, but the last assertion finds increasing confirmation in recent events. As corporate sector entities—particularly multinational corporations—embed themselves in local societies, there is often a desire among *employees* for their corporation to act as a positive force in their communities. A good portion of corporate sector assistance after the 2004 tsunami, for example, was encouraged by local employees of participating companies, suggesting a shift in the expectations for corporate sector behavior within host societies.[1] This transformation has the potential to influence corporate sector relationships with surrounding communities in a way that could have a positive effect on future crisis response.

The past as an indication of the future

The history of humanitarian response has traditionally included some form of corporate assistance for crisis-affected people. An astute observer of humanitarian issues noted that typically the first to assist are locals, including companies with direct links to the affected.[2] In general, the history of corporate philanthropy reflects a growing—but uneven—role in humanitarian crises since at least the 1970s, both in the United States and abroad.

Substantive corporate involvement in crisis management beyond financial giving did not really take root until the end of the 1990s, however. Increasingly, corporate engagement has begun to draw on a company's "core competencies" as a way of enhancing the efficiency of overall response efforts. By centering contributions on the value added of specific corporate expertise and product lines, corporations have started to refine their place in humanitarian response.

Companies specializing in logistics, such as DHL and TNT, began to work with partners like the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN Development Program, the World Food Programme, and nongovernmental organizations such as CARE. In general,

1. International Business Leaders' Forum, "The Role of Employee Engagement in Disaster Response: Learning From Experience," *ENGAGE In Focus*, no. 2 (December 13, 2005).

2. Interview, February 1, 2007.

the corporate sector has remained more closely involved with "natural" crises, although some corporations have found themselves intervening in politically motivated crises, as well.[3]

The United Nations recognized the need to incorporate business in the fight against vulnerability by launching the Global Compact in 2000, which aims to promote sustainable business practices, which include disaster risk reduction, among other key focuses. Closely following the UN-declared International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, the recent UN International Secretariat for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) brought together companies in the insurance, re-insurance, engineering, and construction sectors that had previously participated in a crisis-management dialogue with the UN in the 1990s.

The World Economic Forum (WEF) was also early to recognize the synergy between business and crisis management and in 2001 created the Disaster Resource Network (DRN) in an effort to "mobilize the resources of the international business community to rebuild the lives and livelihoods threatened by natural and man-made disasters."[4]

The U.S. government has also been enthusiastic to pair official assistance with corporate sector partners. Recognizing that roughly 85 percent of U.S. resources reaching the developing world came from the corporate sector,[5] USAID created the Global Development Alliance (GDA) in 2001 to formalize corporate partnerships in development assistance. Although not exclusively focused on humanitarian issues, the GDA includes crisis management activities in its portfolio, and it has developed several partnerships focused on both man-made and natural catastrophes.[6]

Many of these efforts are recent enough that they have not yet had a significant impact on the nature of corporate participation in crisis management. Progress has been steady, however, and both the WEF and USAID have expanded their initial efforts in order to focus private energy more systematically on humanitarian assistance.[7]

Although the trend has been toward greater public-private collaboration since the 1990s, the real catalyst for greater corporate involvement has been two recent major humanitarian crises. The first was the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which was responsible for the deaths of over 280,000 people—nearly 2,000 of whom were European or American. Another galvanizing event was the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, where in the wake of over 70,000 dead, the president of the United States called on the corporate sector to join forces with international relief efforts. This effort eventually contributed over 40 percent of global private funding for the response.

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3. A few—in some instances successfully and in others less so—became involved in conflict resolution activities. Anglo-American Mining's involvement in South-Africa's transition from apartheid has been heralded as a major example of benign self-interest; and less successfully so but equally as relevant was Conoco's efforts to promote peace between contending forces in the Sudan during the late 1980s.

4. World Economic Forum, "Disaster Resource Network: Making Disaster Response and Economic Recovery Our Business," http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/drn/index.htm.

5. USAID, *The Global Development Alliance: Public-Private Alliances for Transformational Development* (Washington, DC: USAID, January 2006), 15, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/gda/pdf/GDA_Report_Jan2006_Full.pdf.

6. This includes programs in postconflict Sierra Leone, postearthquake Armenia, and epidemic-prevention programs, among others.

7. The WEF has recently launched the Humanitarian Relief Initiative, which expands the early success of the Disaster Resource Network beyond the construction industry. (See http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/HumanitarianReliefInitiative/index.htm.) USAID's Global Development Alliance has recently hired staff (July 2007) to lead a specific focus on gaining greater corporate participation in humanitarian assistance, translating its early success in general development work into a humanitarian-specific context. Interview, March 13, 2007.

Figure 2.1. Global Corporate Donations to Tsunami Relief (in millions of $)



Source of data: Business Civic Leadership Center (BCLC), *From Relief to Recovery: The 2005 U.S. Business Response to the Southeast Asia Tsunami and Gulf Coast Hurricanes* (Washington, DC: BCLC, 2006), http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/ecphnbd7xgk7updusn6ebb3zdjkdomwifbcyro5jfqsg2nuivb2tezm7uddzrls3gzgdzkzffgdxwperbmy7uolwxie/from_relief_to_recoverybclc.pdf.

Corporate sector role in two recent cases

The degree of corporate participation in both the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Kashmir earthquake indicate an unmistakable interest in international crisis management. Following the tsunami, U.S. corporate sector contributions played a major part in financing the response, with corporations acting individually and through partnerships with official and nongovernmental organizations. The U.S. corporate sector alone marshaled $566 million in support of response efforts—making it the sixth largest single donor, just behind the government of Japan. One-quarter of this support took the form of in-kind donations of goods and services. Worldwide corporate sector contributions totaled approximately $800 million, meaning that the American corporate sector was responsible for approximately 70 percent of global corporate efforts (see figure 2.1).[8]

Corporate sector enthusiasm continued in the aftermath of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, although to a slightly lesser degree. President Bush tapped the CEOs of five major U.S. corporations to lead the South Asia Earthquake Relief Fund, a fundraising effort targeting the corporate community. The Fund, administered by the Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy (CECP), was an effort to galvanize private giving around the earthquake and to stimulate greater engagement from the corporate sector on the issue.

CECP reported roughly $113 million in corporate sector donations, split almost evenly between cash and in-kind contributions. This money was not channeled through the United Nations, however, and the UN counted over $266 million in separate private funding flows through the Financial Tracking Service of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).[9] These figures broadly indicate that the U.S. corporate sector underwrote roughly 42 percent of

8. Figures come from Business Civic Leadership Center (BCLC), *From Relief to Recovery: The 2005 U.S. Business Response to the Southeast Asia Tsunami and Gulf Coast Hurricanes* (Washington, DC: BCLC, 2006), http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/ecphnbd7xgk7updusn6ebb3zdjkdomwifbcyro5jfqsg2nuivb2tezm7uddzrls3gzgdzkzffgdxwperbmy7uolwxie/from_relief_to_recoverybclc.pdf.

9. The OCHA Financial Tracking service records all money that is reported going toward particular crises. Because the system relies on self-reporting, it cannot be considered comprehensive, although it is the best metric currently available for obtaining a sense of aggregate corporate giving across crises.

Figure 2.2. Global Corporate Donations to Kashmir Earthquake Relief (in millions of $)



Source of data: Business Civic Leadership Center (BCLC), *From Relief to Recovery: The 2005 U.S. Business Response to the Southeast Asia Tsunami and Gulf Coast Hurricanes* (Washington, DC: BCLC, 2006), http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/ecphnbd7xgk7updusn6ebb3zdjkdomwifbcyro5jfqsg2nuivb2tezm7uddzrls3gzgdzkzffgdxwperbmy7uolwxie/from_relief_to_recoverybclc.pdf.

the global corporate contribution to earthquake relief (see figure 2.2).[10] In addition, global private funding flows accounted for the single largest source of financing for the overall response effort, demonstrating the potential impact of the corporate sector on the direction and strength of humanitarian response.

These recent examples suggest a genuine shift in thinking about global responsibilities among corporations. Although the tsunami struck several countries where clear business interests were at stake (e.g., Indonesia, Thailand, and India), the Kashmir earthquake predominantly affected a remote portion of northern Pakistan with a largely underdeveloped business climate. Dismissing the corporate sector's recent crisis management efforts as purely self-interested, therefore, seems inappropriate. In fact, many corporations appear to behave as if their survival and sense of identity transcend traditional notions of "good business sense" to embrace the idea of a deeper role in global society. This idea is supported by one poll that found that the overwhelming majority of surveyed American CEOs favored greater intercorporate collaboration on important global issues.[11]

The logic of corporate participation

Recent scholarship confirms the argument that corporations are genuinely seeking a more holistic role in global society. In a recent analysis of the relationship between the corporate sector and social service organizations (including disaster relief and development agencies), it was noted that "the liberalization of markets is forcing executives and social activists to work together. They are

10. These statistics should be seen as a barometer of U.S. giving as a share of international giving. Because the OCHA Financial Tracking Service cannot capture *all* worldwide donations, and because some U.S. corporations doubtless gave outside the SAERF framework (either through the UN or directly), the ratio should be interpreted as indicative rather than comprehensive.

11. In a poll of CEOs conducted by the Committee for Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy, 94 percent said the private sector should collaborate to move the needle on global issues. According to the CECP, responses were much more fragmented when the question became "how." See also Susan Forbes Martin and Patricia Weiss Fagen, *Philanthropic Grantmaking for Disaster Management: Trend Analysis and Recommended Improvements* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2006), http://isim.georgetown.edu/Publications/SusanPubs/Grantmaking%20for%20disaster%20management%20%28gates%20foundation%29.pdf.

developing new business models that will transform organizations and the lives of poor people everywhere."[12]

A major force behind corporate-humanitarian collaboration is global economic liberalization, which has facilitated corporate sector access to countries around the world and simultaneously increased global scrutiny of corporate behavior. As a result, both the humanitarian and corporate communities find themselves reliant on one another in order to fulfill their mandates as thoroughly as possible. The logic of this trend suggests a stronger corporate commitment to crisis management than some humanitarians suppose. Broad trends toward greater liberalization around the world indicate a strong likelihood that the corporate sector's motivation to participate in crisis management will remain relatively steady.

A new social compact is emerging that links corporations with humanitarian actors. This proposition assumes that the corporate sector and social activists must establish greater convergence to meet their objectives and is based on three major trends:[13] pooling of expertise in order to create mutually beneficial operating standards, leveraging credibility and networks to enhance mutual access to difficult markets,[14] and growth in professional norms that facilitate coordination. By outlining the benefits that each community gains through collaboration, these trends support the argument that corporate involvement springs from serious motivations and is unlikely to drop precipitously in the future.

Types of Corporate Engagement in Humanitarian Crises

Corporate involvement in humanitarian response has been significant in the last 15 years. Although corporate financial giving has risen tremendously since 2000 in particular, of even greater interest is the steady growth of in-kind contributions based on corporate sector core competencies. Private companies increasingly voice an interest in organizing their philanthropy around specific corporate skills. According to companies who base their giving on core competencies, this approach will enhance their value added to crisis management, as well as more clearly define roles for different actors during a response.[15] This approach, often described as "strategic giving," broadens the possible spectrum of contributors to include corporations that may not immediately be associated with crisis response but that possess skills that may be neglected by response agencies focused on more direct needs, such as financial or program management (e.g., Microsoft Office in a Box).

Financial assistance

As noted, corporate financial giving to international crises has grown considerably, with the U.S.

12. Jeb Brugmann and C. K. Prahalad, "Co-creating Business's New Social Compact," *Harvard Business Review* 85, no. 2 (February 2007): 80.

13. Ibid.

14. Most major corporations find it difficult to penetrate the bottom-of-the-pyramid market, where 5 billion real and potential consumers exist. Humanitarians, in turn, can find it difficult to reach the higher end of the pyramid for funding and advocacy purposes. Convergence of humanitarian and corporate interests occurs, for example, where the former have access to social structures and the latter have commercial capacities in the fields of microfinance and microinsurance.

15. Interview, March 16, 2007.

corporate sector accounting for the largest single share of worldwide private donations in two major recent disasters.[16]

Evidence suggests that corporations will offer even greater support when they can directly trace the impact of a disaster to their communities. Hurricane Katrina, a domestic disaster mainly outside the scope of this report, generated $1.2 billion in American corporate sector assistance—shattering the record that had been set only 18 months earlier during the tsunami.[17] As crises begin to encroach on the developed world where many corporations are headquartered, private sector giving is likely to become even more important.

Financial assistance appears to go principally through nongovernmental organizations, largely because corporations believe that an association with an NGO can help counter criticism of perceived corporate sector motives.[18] When compared with the NGO sector, government or UN agencies are often seen as either too complicated or too unfamiliar to serve as effective conduits for philanthropy.[19] This attitude persists even in cases in which UN tools, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), have made important efforts to reach out to corporate partners.[20]

In-kind assistance and core competencies

Numerous examples reflect a growing trend within the corporate sector to base their giving around "core competencies" that could best support relief efforts. Aid agencies often prefer cash donations, but the philanthropic arms of many corporations prefer in-kind assistance that can draw on existing corporate strengths, as well as be associated with longer-term partnerships.[21]

Perhaps the most notable example of expertise-based giving is the partnership between TNT, a Netherlands-based shipping company, and the World Food Programme (WFP). Since 2002, TNT has donated $11.5 million (€8.5 million) to WFP activities, of which $9.5 million (€7 million) has been through in-kind support.[22] In addition to agreements on the shipping of relief supplies, TNT and WFP have forged a partnership on a host of issues, including an entire project dedicated to best practices, which seeks to standardize procedures across the WFP network by drawing on the expertise of TNT as a global leader in shipping.[23] This includes not only supply chain management, but questions of management structure and organization, as well. Much of the success of this sort of giving has been the willingness of WFP to incorporate business models in its practice, and WFP leadership remains committed to this strategy.[24]

The use of core competencies goes well beyond logistics, however. Microsoft, for example, dispatched Asia Disaster Technical Response Teams to the affected area after the tsunami in an effort to find technical solutions to problems on the ground. These included specific projects, such as

16. BCLC, *From Relief to Recovery.* See also Martin and Fagen, *Philanthropic Grantmaking for Disaster Management*.

17. BCLC, *From Relief to Recovery*, 23.

18. Interview, March 15, 2007.

19. Interview, March 15, 2007.

20. The South Asia Earthquake Relief Fund (SAERF), for example, chose not to channel any of its money through the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which administrators considered too unfamiliar. Interview, March 15, 2007.

21. In practice, many corporations making in-kind donations also give financially, although there are increasing efforts to spend this money in areas most closely related to the company's expertise.

22. TNT Web site, http://group.tnt.com/wfp/knowledge/introduction/index.asp.

23. TNT Web site.

24. Interview, November 3, 2006.

the development of Sinhalese-enabled software that permitted workers to type, search, and print data in Sinhalese, as well as broader efforts, such as creating new maps of the affected region to facilitate response efforts.[25] Citibank, in addition to offering funds to match employee donations, also offered financial services where they had broken down, such as pioneering methods to enable local automatic teller machines (ATMs) to accept relief donations following the tsunami.[26] These examples demonstrate not only the diversity of corporate giving, but also its potential to fill gaps through in-kind giving that could easily be overlooked as humanitarian organizations strive to deliver more critical relief.

Building partnerships

The corporate sector prefers partnerships where "established relationships of trust" have developed natural corporate conduits and where individual companies can stake out a sense of "exclusivity" over the specific programs that they choose to support.[27] Although there is no intention to develop a controlling hold over NGO partners as organizations, there is a distinct sense that a tried and tested relationship—often centered around a specific issue—allows for more effective use of resources. In the words of one observer, "Long-standing relationships work the best, as partners are not thrown together *ad hoc*, under extreme pressure. Unfortunately, there is not a long list of such partnerships."[28]

As more corporate resources become involved in crisis management, enthusiasm is waning for the informal processes through which many corporate and partner organizations previously organized their relationships. As a result, corporate sector entities are increasingly favorable to some sort of humanitarian "credentialing" process, through which appropriate potential partners are "accredited."[29] This would facilitate partner selection and would standardize private-humanitarian interactions on a host of issues.

The tsunami experience particularly highlighted the need to organize corporate-humanitarian collaboration more formally, and there has been a proliferation of initiatives in this area since 2004.[30] Genuine partnership appears key to the successful leveraging of corporate noncash resources into humanitarian practice, but much of the humanitarian sector continues to equate "corporate partnership" with "cash."[31] There have been significant efforts to broaden humanitarian understanding in this area, particularly UN efforts within WFP (see above) and OCHA, which is striving to create a clearer operating environment with its corporate partners.[32]

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25. For more detail, see http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/jan05/0106TsunamiFS.mspx.

26. Interview, March 16, 2007. See also http://www.citigroup.com/citigroup/press/2005/050118a.htm.

27. Interview, March 15, 2007. See also Martin and Fagen, *Philanthropic Grantmaking for Disaster Management*.

28. Interview, March 14, 2007. Johnson & Johnson was considered a good example of an organization that had established sound partnerships and was able to "call around to NGOs in Iraq to enquire if they may need x, y, and z." Interview, March 13, 2007.

29. Interviews, March 12–13, 2007.

30. Andrea Binder and Jan Martin Witte, "Business Engagement in Humanitarian Relief: Key Trends and Policy Implications," *HPG Background Paper* (London: Overseas Development Group, June 2007), 11. See also Martin and Fagen, *Philanthropic Grantmaking for Disaster Management*.

31. Binder and Witte, "Business Engagement in Humanitarian Relief," 25.

32. See, for example OCHA/World Economic Forum (WEF), *Guiding Principles for Public-Private Collaboration for Humanitarian Action* (UN, December 2007). See also Christelle Loupforest, "The Three Pillars of Humanitarian Reform," *The UN-Business Focal Point*, no. 2 (OCHA, July 6, 2006).

Table 2.1. Private Donations Tracked by UN OCHA

Year	Amount	Year	Amount
1999	$263,860	2003	$8,736,789
2000	$2,832,755	2004	$13,431,307
2001	$4,446,103	2005	$3,521,376,491
2002	$16,692,421	2006	$11,645,426

Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Unit

Note: These numbers represent the total funding marked "Private (individual and organizations)," which forms the subset of money that was private in origin but not flagged to an NGO or other service organization. These numbers are imperfect because OCHA does not presently categorize the corporate sector separately, but they should provide a useful barometer of corporate giving trends. The huge jump in 2005 is attributable to the tsunami and should not be considered as part of the general trend line.

Sustainability of Corporate Involvement in the Humanitarian Sector

The corporate sector's involvement in humanitarian response is likely to continue, with the potential to grow considerably. The assumptions that underpin this statement include relatively consistent increases in past participation,[33] clear links with corporate social responsibility initiatives, human resource determinants, potential market opportunities, and the implications for protecting corporate assets.

That said, some factors could add uncertainty to this trend. The more that humanitarian crises become part of a complex interplay between the impact of natural hazards and man-made emergencies, the less the corporate sector will want to have an overt humanitarian role. If the past points to at least some aspects of the future, it is evident that companies will continue to be reluctant to become embroiled in matters deemed overtly political—no matter how ostensibly humanitarian the cause.[34]

Companies realize that employees want to work for organizations that transcend the "bottom line." As was noted by one corporate consortium representative, corporate involvement in humanitarian response is also "good human resource management."[35] This attitude points to a sustainable role for corporations, especially as global business operations expand. On the other hand, this could also indicate a reluctance to provide assistance away from areas of direct business interests, as such an approach would not be considered "strategic philanthropy," according to one major corporate responder.[36]

Although current trends seem to indicate a sustainable commitment, there is some reason for uncertainty. First, corporations simply do not conceive of themselves as humanitarian responders, a point mentioned in each of this study's corporate sector interviews. This means that there is conceivably a "glass ceiling" beyond which the corporate sector will be uninterested in participating.

33. The sudden leap in 2005 is attributable to the tsunami, and the drop-off afterwards should not be attributed to waning interest, but rather to a "return to normalcy."

34. All of this study's corporate interviewees signaled reluctance within the private sector to become involved in complex emergencies for practical and political reasons. This opinion is also confirmed by recent research in Binder and Witte, "Business engagement in humanitarian relief."

35. Interview, March 14, 2007.

36. Interview, March 15, 2007.

In addition, this commitment could evolve as corporate interests change. After the tremendous giving following the tsunami, many U.S. corporations were shocked by the impact of Hurricane Katrina, for example. The end result is that some corporate observers foresee a diminishing role for the U.S. business community in international crisis management, in favor of either a more domestic focus or entirely new pursuits.[37] This supports the argument that corporate participation will be limited to direct areas of interest, meaning that as crises increasingly affect the industrialized world, corporations will increasingly focus their efforts there, as well.

Finally, corporate interests are much more likely to be affected by shifts in the business cycle than government and NGO responses would be.

Despite uncertainty about the degree to which the future corporate role will increase, there is little doubt that corporations will continue to be an important part of global crisis management. The impact of their role could be significantly enhanced by devising mechanisms that would more systematically expose the humanitarian sector to useful corporate practices and innovations.

The Corporate Sector as an Innovator in Humanitarian Response

The most successful corporations possess an innovative spirit that allows them to remain up-to-date with constantly changing market conditions, which is essential to their survival. This spirit fosters rigorous attention to business models, organizations, and institutional learning. Because the humanitarian sector does not operate from the profit motive, it lacks much of the urgency that accompanies corporate sector action when embracing change.

Humanitarians and businessmen work in fundamentally different environments, however. Declarations that crisis management should be analyzed as a "market" are ultimately unsatisfying, as they do not recognize that, at best, the humanitarian sector operates in a "quasi-market" with inherent distortions.[38] Working to create forums in which humanitarians and corporate sector representatives can regularly interact is the most helpful strategy for leveraging the innovative spirit of the business community into humanitarian response.

Such interactions are already taking place to the benefit of both communities, and although they have largely been ad hoc, these interactions have shown significant results in some cases. The creation of Plumpy'nut, a high-nutrition food source, is one such example. Plumpy'nut is a high-protein, high-calorie famine-relief product suitable for children that can be distributed at home, rather than at specialized nutrition sites. Distributed in foil packets, the peanut-based paste is inexpensive, highly durable, and, perhaps crucially, from the point of view of children, tasty.[39]

Plumpy'nut was developed by André Briend, a French scientist working with the World Health Organization (WHO). As WHO is in no position to begin mass production of any individual development, relief workers required corporate sector partners who would be willing to produce and distribute Plumpy'nut, despite the weak buying power of the "target market" and associated low profit projections. The solution was Nutriset, a French company that specializes in famine relief products.

37. Interviews, March 14–16, 2007.

38. Binder and Witte, "Business Engagement in Humanitarian Relief."

39. Michael Wines, "Hope for Hungry Children, Arriving in a Foil Packet," *New York Times*, sec. A, August 8, 2005.

Nutriset operates from a standard business model, but it seeks to reinvest profit in the company in order to "finance our [famine relief] objectives."[40] Nutriset has itself pioneered some 60 innovations in famine-relief products through its own research and development program, financed by the reinvestment of company profits. Clearly, Nutriset's business focus on areas of endemic poverty is atypical, but the company does illustrate the utility in creating "collaboration pools" that spill across the humanitarian-corporate divide.[41] One positive aspect of this, however, has been the ability to spin production off into developing countries, thus contributing to development more broadly.[42]

Nutriset also illustrates the potential of corporate sector partners to produce externally generated innovations. Most companies will be unwilling (or unable) to invest in expensive research and development of products that, due to the impoverished buying power of the crisis-affected, are unlikely to pay back the investment. But conditions could be created so as to encourage greater private participation, particularly in the production and distribution of such innovations, which requires less cost overhead than research and development. Research programs could be financed by donors, for example, or by the military, which already possesses a significant R&D program that is not necessarily bound by the corporate sector's need for profit assurance (see chapter 3).

Besides taking a direct role in generating new, humanitarian-specific developments, the corporate sector can also offer innovations by simply making its expertise available to humanitarian partners. This can take the form of Citibank's rewiring ATMs during a specific emergency, as described above, or can be a more general partnership. An example of the latter is the partnership of the American Association for the Advancement of Science's (AAAS) International Office with several private satellite companies.

Satellite companies typically sell imagery to militaries for high prices but have been willing to sell at discounted rates—or even donate—archival imagery to the AAAS International Office's human rights program.[43] Although new imagery still demands the full price, archival pieces are significant in establishing "baselines" in places like Darfur (or pre-tsunami Aceh) for documenting crisis impact accurately. In this case, there could be an additional role for the government to purchase market-rate imagery and make it readily available to the humanitarian sector—without undue classification as "secret" (see chapter 3).

These are only two examples of the existing partnerships that have helped important innovations reach humanitarian practice, and both have been largely ad hoc. Increasing the regularity of corporate-humanitarian interaction could yield such results more frequently by bringing a greater share of corporate innovation to bear on crisis management. By conceiving of the corporate contribution as part of a larger "collaboration pool," the humanitarian sector can realistically incorporate corporate sector expertise into response. Recent trends appear to be moving in this direction, with one recent analysis noting five broad-based, multistakeholder initiatives in humanitarian-corporate collaboration.[44]

In addition, the recent World Economic Forum Humanitarian Relief Initiative (HRI) seeks to broaden the success of the largely construction-focused Disaster Resource Network into a larger

40. Nutriset Web site, http://www.nutriset.fr/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1.

41. "Collaboration pools" are taken up at greater length in chapter 4.

42. Plumpy'nut production centers are franchised throughout the global South. See http://www.plumpynutinthefield.com/eng/index-eng.php.

43. Correspondence, AAAS, August 2007.

44. Binder and Witte, "Business Engagement in Humanitarian Relief," 29.

forum for interaction.[45] HRI and OCHA drafted a set of guidelines for corporate participation in humanitarian action in January 2007, which was revised the following July based on comments from corporate representatives through public-private consultations in Geneva.[46] The HRI effort is a step in the right direction, and it deserves greater institutional support from the WEF as it seeks to expand its membership base into a forum that can bring corporate and humanitarian expertise together.

To be truly effective, however, "collaboration pools" cannot be limited to the corporate sector and humanitarian agents, as both have demonstrated aspects that can in some cases hinder the progress of innovation in crisis management. The military, for its part, brings an essential capacity to this question, and this capacity is the focus of the next chapter.

45. HRI Web site, http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/HumanitarianReliefInitiative/index.htm.

46. World Economic Forum and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guiding Principles for Philanthropic Private Sector Engagement in Humanitarian Action* (July 23, 2007); interview, July 2007.

3 MILITARY SUPPORT, CAPACITIES, AND INTERVENTION

The use of the U.S. military in humanitarian relief operations is contentious. Many civilian observers worry that U.S. military involvement threatens the principles of neutrality that are supposed to guide humanitarian response, and many in the military remain uneasy about taking on a role outside the traditional war-fighting mandate. Unsurprisingly, a significant portion of aid workers interviewed for this project expressed skepticism about the motives and implications of military participation in crisis management. This reluctance was significantly more pronounced than in the corporate case, owing mainly to the potential political implications that the military can bring to humanitarian crises, particularly during complex emergencies.

Respondents acknowledged that many countries, such as India, successfully employ national forces during domestic disasters, and they suggested a need to distinguish between natural and conflict-related emergencies when discussing military assistance. Despite these nuances, many were uncomfortable with direct military involvement in crisis response and interpreted a military presence as a threat to core humanitarian principles.

These attitudes persist despite the clear success of military assistance during recent crises. U.S. military support, for example, was essential to both the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2005 Kashmir earthquake response operations—contributing critical lift capacity via helicopter, among other urgent services.

In practice, many crisis managers in the field reported a smooth working relationship with the military, but mutual hostility at the headquarters level often appears unabated.[1] These dynamics can be significantly dependent on the involved personalities, meaning that the tenor of interactions can shift significantly with turnover in personnel. The cultural clash between the military and the traditional response sector has the potential to isolate each group from the useful practices of the other, thus undercutting the effectiveness of both during humanitarian operations.

Efforts to bridge this divide are being made on both sides, however. InterAction, a major NGO consortium based in Washington, has investigated practical approaches to the military for the humanitarian sector, culminating in a recent set of guidelines on NGO-military interactions.[2] Within the Department of Defense (DOD), representatives from the Global Security Affairs division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which coordinates much of DOD humanitarian assistance, has been working directly with NGOs to improve the joint operating environment.[3]

As in the corporate case, the response community must examine three key issues when considering U.S. military contributions: motivation, sustainability, and innovations. All three should be seen initially in the context of the U.S. military's recent history in crisis management.

1. Interviews, November 20, 2006; November 22, 2006; March 19, 2007.
2. See http://www.interaction.org/hpp/military.html.
3. Interview, March 19, 2007. Other offices in OSD are involved in humanitarian assistance, notably the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), as well as the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict division, which focuses on U.S. action in complex emergencies (among other objectives).

Background on U.S. Military Assistance in Humanitarian Response

The U.S. military is dependent on civilian authorities before it can become involved in natural disaster response overseas. Following a declaration of emergency by the U.S. ambassador at the request of the local government, the military is authorized to arrange humanitarian assistance, which is planned and executed through the individual Combatant Commands (COCOMs). As a result, there is a wide variety of approaches to assistance within the military, and predisaster planning is not a uniform practice.

The Department of Defense also manages the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, which is a portion of the Defense budget reserved for DOD-led humanitarian assistance. This money is used to fund a diverse collection of programs through DOD agencies and the COCOMs, both in conflict zones, underdeveloped areas, and following natural disasters. Funding for FY 2007 stands at $62.3 million.[4]

OHDACA money supports both natural and complex emergencies, although it is in the latter that the Department of Defense has taken an increasingly visible role in recent years. Two recent policy documents attest to DOD's commitment to complex emergencies: the 2005 Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.15 and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), both of which place "stabilization" activities within the military's core mandate and on equal footing with war fighting.[5] New funding initiatives, such as the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), which provides discretionary humanitarian funding to U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, also signal the military's commitment to becoming more agile in its approach to crisis management.[6]

Global political realities have shifted much of this thinking since September 11, but one recent study concluded that the "U.S. military force structure and doctrine have not been greatly shaped by a need to prepare for peacekeeping or military operations in pursuit of humanitarian objectives."[7]

Humanitarian assistance has long been recognized as a useful instrument in "hearts and minds" campaigns, notably during American efforts in Vietnam in the late 1960s. After the end of the Cold War, the military increasingly looked to humanitarian operations as a useful strategy for keeping soldiers trained and busy during periods of relative peace, such as during the peacekeeping phase in the aftermath of U.S. involvement in Kosovo in 1999. Humanitarian engagement therefore has always been a feature of U.S. military activities, but until now, it has lacked a strategic framework to guide its application.[8]

4. See OHDACA FY 2007 Budget Estimate, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm.

5. QDR citation; DODD 3000.15 Sec 4.1.

6. CERP was developed to allow commanders to fund reconstruction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan as flexibly as possible. Approved by Congress, funding up to $500 million in 2007 was available. See Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan to Help Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sector" (Washington, DC: GAO, June 22, 2007), 14.

7. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, eds., *Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, HPG Report #21 (Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, March 2006), 26.

8. Humanitarian assistance has been increasingly accepted at the policy level within the Department of Defense. The two strongest examples of this, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and Department of Defense Directive 3000.15, are discussed later in this chapter.

Figure 3.1. Public Opinion of the United States in Indonesia and Pakistan



Military response and natural disasters

In general, U.S. military commitments to natural disasters have been the most consistent, as these interventions carry fewer political complications. For example, after the 1970 Bhola cyclone, which killed roughly 250,000 people in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh), the U.S. military played an essential role in conjunction with several other national militaries. In many instances, U.S.-led forces replaced the largely "preoccupied" Pakistani military,[9] dispatching 29 helicopters to the area and offering further support from ships anchored in the Bay of Bengal.[10] At the time, many humanitarians attributed U.S. military participation to a desire to dissuade the Soviet Union from taking advantage of a tragedy with potential political ramifications, as well as to counter the donations from Communist governments.

It is difficult to prove that political objectives were the primary driver of the U.S. military's efforts in then-East Pakistan, although it is likely that they constituted a substantial motivation. In other words, from the early days of military intervention in humanitarian crises, response objectives have been tied to broader political goals, a fact readily recognized by military officials today.[11] The latest evidence of recognition of a connection for this can be found in the U.S. military role following the 2004 tsunami and 2005 Kashmir earthquake, when major American military support helped prompt surges in public approval of the United States in key Muslim-majority states (see figure 3.1).[12]

Past experiences demonstrate the potential effectiveness of the U.S. military on two major fronts. Principally, the military has proven that it possesses the unrivalled communications and lift

9. "East Pakistan: The Politics of Catastrophe," *Time*, December 7, 1970, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,877136,00.html.

10. Ibid.

11. Interview, March 20, 2007.

12. Following the tsunami, the percentage of Indonesians holding a favorable view of the United States rose from 15 percent in 2003 to 44 percent in 2006. Over 60 percent of respondents attributed any shift directly to U.S. humanitarian assistance. See Terror Free Tomorrow, *One Year Later: Humanitarian Relief Sustains Change in Muslim Public Opinion* (Washington, DC: Terror Free Tomorrow, 2006). In Pakistan, postearthquake assistance from the United States lifted the percentage of Pakistanis with a favorable opinion of the United States from 21 percent in 2004 to 46 percent immediately after the earthquake. The figure in Pakistan has since dropped to 15 percent. See Craig Cohen, *A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan* (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, August 10, 2007).

capacities to deliver essential relief to inaccessible areas. Aid agencies typically greet this assistance with enthusiasm, as it permits them to extend the reach of their services significantly. For the military, the jump in public approval of the United States that often follows humanitarian operations demonstrates the important impact of humanitarian assistance on "hearts and minds," even among usually hostile populations.

Despite often positive field-level working relationships, frustrations frequently emerge among aid providers who find that military participants often resist sharing information, are insufficiently briefed about the humanitarian sector, and coordinate their efforts poorly.[13] This contributes to stovepiped information flows and fuels resentment toward the military among humanitarian practitioners.

Military response and complex emergencies

The military has a mixed record in the management of complex emergencies, which may partially account for the reluctance to add stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian responsibilities[14] to its core mission before it is mandated by DODD 3000.15 in 2005.

Despite this reluctance, the military played an increasing role in responding to complex emergencies throughout the 1990s, and this role has become more pronounced since the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. A recent review of American military involvement in six complex emergencies during the 1990s concluded that U.S. military assistance was successful in four cases.[15] This record—a two-thirds success rate—is not wholly inspiring, but it does indicate a robust military commitment even before DODD 3000.15.

Military Strengths in Crisis Management

Within the American military, policymakers have created several programs intended to improve military-led humanitarian assistance. These programs are typically managed through individual COCOMs, meaning they are not necessarily standardized across the defense community. Three examples are worth noting to illustrate the experience, capacity, and potential that greater military-humanitarian collaboration could offer in confronting the threats of the future.

Disaster Preparedness Mitigation Assessment Program

The Disaster Preparedness Mitigation Assessment (DPMA) Program reflects an interesting dimension of the military's potential for crisis management. The DPMA gauges the capacity of countries to react to natural or manmade disasters before they occur.[16] Administered as part of U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) Theater Security Cooperation Plan, DPMA focuses chiefly on the response capabilities of small-island states, and the program is initiated via host country request, with approval from the relevant U.S. embassy and DOD.[17]

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13. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report* (London: Overseas Development Institute, July 2006).

14. These activities are also known as stability operations, Phase IV, and Phase 0, among other names.

15. Taylor B. Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure* (Oxford: SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 2007).

16. William H. LaFontaine, *Disaster Preparedness Mitigation Assessments: A USPACOM Theater Engagement Tool* (Carlisle, Pa: U.S. Army War College, February 2003).

17. Theoretically, any country within the PACOM theater could participate in this process, although there is a focus on developing countries that would be particularly handicapped by disaster. Recent participants included Tokelau Island, Palau, Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Through interagency teams, DPMA informs PACOM's larger disaster planning efforts by analyzing host countries' capabilities to respond to likely crisis scenarios. These assessments provide PACOM with a greater appreciation of where the need for U.S. assistance would be greatest in a disaster. Pre-event contingency planning is often discussed within the humanitarian sector, but in practice, many humanitarian organizations lack the resources to adopt such programs.

In addition to identifying capacity gaps, DPMA assists countries in improving their response capabilities. This approach includes disaster risk exercises that test a government's ability to respond to a specific scenario in order to identify areas that require additional assistance. These exercises help strengthen the ability of local officials to plan accurately for crises, which in turn contributes to local capacity building—a key focus of crisis risk management.[18] Although the humanitarian sector has long advocated for greater capacity-building initiatives, many organizations lack the resources to support similar programs, and efforts to do so have often fallen short.[19]

Although limited in geographic scope, DPMA could be enormously beneficial if expanded beyond the Pacific and to incorporate more nonmilitary partners. It could also become a model to be adopted by all the COCOMs, adjusted according to the requirements of each region. Because the military has the resources to run these programs, sharing the results with major humanitarian actors could provide a useful "road map" for capacity-building initiatives that the military may support but would be uninterested in implementing.

New Horizons

The New Horizons program, linked since the 1980s to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), offers a series of joint humanitarian assistance exercises in Latin America and the Caribbean. This program involves joint training of U.S. Engineer, Medical, and Combat Service Support units for humanitarian assistance, typically focusing on infrastructure construction.

New Horizons also includes Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs), which dispatch military teams of doctors, nurses, and dentists to provide health services to host countries requiring care.[20] The program incorporates local medical staff in their missions to provide training opportunities and establish links between SOUTHCOM and local service providers. As in the case of DPMA, the goals of New Horizons—although limited geographically—match many of the goals of the humanitarian sector. Humanitarians may support such work, but they often lack the resources to sustain similar programs outside of emergency conditions.

Denton

The Denton program is a U.S. interagency initiative, including the Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID, that facilitates the access of private voluntary organizations to available space on military flights in order to ship relief materials. This program has shipped millions of pounds of humanitarian aid worldwide at no cost to the donating organizations, with over 576,000 pounds traveling to 12 countries in 2006 alone.[21]

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18. See Hyogo Framework for Action, especially provisions on local capacity, Section III. A (g) and (h).

19. TEC, *Joint Evaluation of the International Response*.

20. U.S. forces are conducting New Horizons exercises in five countries in FY 2007, chiefly in rural and underprivileged areas.

21. See http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/denton.html.

Looking toward the future, the inevitable question is whether this capacity can be enhanced to meet greater demands for assistance, and whether the program could be expanded from "space-available" to a more purposeful initiative that regularly links humanitarian organizations to military transport. This would offer not only greater capacity, but also more time-sensitive availability.

When reflecting on the motivations, sustainability, and innovations of the U.S. military, we can infer from these three examples that the military has valuable capacity across a spectrum of operational (e.g., engineering, medical, construction) and logistics (e.g., lift capacity) interventions, and that an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral agreements (such as DPMA and New Horizons) link local response capabilities to the U.S. military. Similar NATO commitments add to the potential scope of U.S. military involvement in humanitarian response.[22]

The U.S. Military's Motivation in Humanitarian Operations

At the most basic level, the "motivations" for U.S. military engagement in humanitarian crises is straightforward: it is determined by orders from civilian authorities. This conclusion is ultimately unsatisfying, however, and appears harsh against the backdrop of the tremendous efforts made by the military's humanitarian programs.

Still, the ethos of the U.S. military—as opposed to the corporate sector—affords little space for activities that go beyond its primary function. This attitude is apparent in published literature, as well as in the responses of interviewed personnel, some of whom indicated a senior-level reluctance to institutionalize humanitarian response within the military's mission, largely owing to concerns that doing so would dilute its traditional focus.[23]

Current definitions of military objectives are built around a rather narrow conception of national security, and thus they limit the initiative that the military can take on humanitarian issues. The end result is pockets of effective programs, such as the isolated examples above, that are rarely standardized beyond limited areas.

Evidence suggests that the military's concept of national security is expanding, however. Far-sighted DOD and military leaders see the value in adopting a more balanced approach to security. Two major trends are likely to influence military objectives in the foreseeable future, possibly offering greater accommodation to crisis management goals.

1. The Quadrennial Defense Review and humanitarian intervention

The final implications of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for humanitarian response remain unclear. Some humanitarians remain skeptical of its ultimate effects, whereas others see an opening for more effective, predictable military engagement where "direct [U.S.] interests are involved, or the costs are relatively low."[24]

22. Laure Borgomano-Loup, *Improving NGO-NATO Relations in Crisis Response Operations* (Rome: NATO Defense College Research Branch, March 2007).

23. Interview, March 19, 2007.

24. Andrew Cottley and Ted Bikin-Kita, "The Military and Humanitarianism: Emerging Patterns of Intervention and Engagement," in Wheeler and Harmer, eds., *Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations* (London: ODI, March 2006), 26.

In any event, the QDR does refer to humanitarian intervention by U.S. armed forces in several instances, and the relevance of humanitarian engagement for the military and Department of Defense as a whole has been publicly announced in a variety of forums.[25] This indicates a certain mainstreaming of humanitarian issues within defense circles, pointing toward an expansion of the military's traditional mandate.

A more complicated issue is how the QDR defines the concept of "humanitarian engagement." The QDR definition is clearly not limited to conventional emergency assistance, and it even envisages a policy of humanitarian prevention. According to the document, by focusing on attempts to alleviate suffering and respond to crises in their early stages, military efforts are supposed to "[help] prevent disorder from spiraling into conflict or crisis. They also demonstrate the goodwill and compassion of the United States."[26]

The QDR's most consistent theme is the preventive links that humanitarian assistance affords to stabilize conflict situations. Generally speaking, prevention is a key goal of the humanitarian community as well, and this focus would seem to indicate a potential area for cooperation. The QDR's subsequent focus on improving the image of the United States, however, indicates a political objective that may alienate humanitarians who are fearful of being instrumentalized. A similar thrust is present in DODD 3000.15, which elevated stability operations to a core mission of the military when these missions "advance U.S. interests and values."[27]

2. Future catastrophes and the military's humanitarian engagement

Although there is greater comfort with military participation following natural disasters, future crises will increasingly render the distinction between "natural" and "man-made" disasters irrelevant. This study recognizes the growing complexity and interrelation of crisis drivers and acknowledges that natural disasters are increasingly likely to expose human vulnerabilities, with the potential to exacerbate political and social frailties.[28]

The implications of these trends for the U.S. military—particularly in light of QDR commitments to preventive humanitarian action—are significant. As the incidence of natural disasters intensifies and demonstrates links to political crises, broader potential consequences for global stability will become apparent. In short, the nature of humanitarian crises in the future will force an expansion of the traditional concept of security to encompass humanitarian threats, implicating a role for the military in both natural and political crises.

The QDR represents an early acceptance of this logic, outlining an emerging role for the U.S. military, as well as a concern for "security" in all its dimensions. The recent decision to create a new U.S. Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) is a case in point, as Africa poses essen-

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25. See Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defense; Rear Admiral Terry Blake, Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition, Joint Staff, before the Foreign Press Association, February 6, 2006; see also Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2006), 12–15.

26. DOD, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 12–15.

27. Department of Defense Directive 3000.15, Sec. 4.2.

28. One recent example was the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which some observers cite as an important influence on restarting the conflict in Sri Lanka.

tially zero traditional security threats to the United States but has been a center of instability and humanitarian crisis for decades.[29]

Sustainability of the Military as a Response Actor

Although there are clear signals that military policy is moving toward greater acceptance of humanitarian missions, the sustainability of this direction remains a fundamental concern. In other words, is this a permanent policy shift indicating predictable future reliability, or is it more of a "fad," likely to change as other political dynamics—particularly the war on terrorism—evolve?

OHDACA funding is not an exhaustive indicator of military commitment to crisis management, although it can serve as a useful barometer for government attitudes to the military's role. Variations in funding over roughly the last 10 years have been relatively stable—indicating a mostly steady commitment—with the exception of the last two years. The $40 million increase expected for FY 2008 represents an increase of roughly two-thirds (to $103 million) and is at least partially a reflection of the policy set forth in the 2006 QDR and DODD 3000.05.[30] Similar requests are predicted for FY 2009 as well.

Overall, the FY 2008 Department of Defense budget for humanitarian assistance will have tripled since 2006. According to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), that increase is by no means solely for natural disasters, with a significant amount of money intended to support what the QDR refers to as "conventional forces *plus*."[31] Similar trends in CERP funding, which gives more discretionary money to commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan for humanitarian projects, supports this idea.[32]

Sustainability in the context of U.S. military command structures

For better or for worse, policy often takes on a bureaucratic inertia and rarely falls victim to radical change. Institutional initiatives are mostly sustained until deep organizational crises irrefutably demonstrate their lack of utility.[33] Although these patterns do not offer a guarantee of sustainability, it is difficult to envisage any significant retreat of the military from its evolving role in humanitarian affairs—particularly given the growing perception within DOD that humanitarian instruments support wider military objectives.

Some analysts have suggested that a military role in humanitarian assistance should be supported through a special presidential initiative, namely by supplementing the current policy

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29. The establishment of DOD's AFRICOM, to be operational by September 2008, "reflects a recognition by U.S. policymakers that American interests in Africa, including countering terrorism, maintaining access to African energy resources, and addressing the challenges posed by poverty, corruption, armed conflict, and disease, necessitate greater focus by DOD. Financial, logistical, and training constraints have often hindered the ability of African militaries to adequately meet these challenges, as have military force readiness issues related to high HIV/AIDS rates. AFRICOM's responsibilities will include 'soft power' engagement such as 'humanitarian response.'" Lauren Ploch, "AFRICOM: The U.S. Military Consolidates Its Efforts in Africa" (Washington, DC: CSIS Africa Policy Forum, June 14, 2007).

30. Interview, March 19, 2007.

31. Interview, March 20, 2007; *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 12–15.

32. The White House FY 2008 budget request included $767 million for the CERP, an increase of 50 percent.

33. John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

framework with a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD).[34] This would solidify the current trend toward greater political support; it is taken up in chapter 4 of this study.

The U.S. Military as a Humanitarian Response Innovator

The military's approach to humanitarian assistance suggests that it conducts humanitarian operations both in support of its own objectives and in support of traditional humanitarian organizations. Assessment of the military's potential as a humanitarian innovator, however, requires consideration of the issue of *predictability*—the reliability and consistency of military involvement and willingness to collaborate. Two major constraints may influence the military's predictability as a humanitarian partner: security and the rise of non-state actors.

In the past, security issues have limited the application of military innovations in crisis management, such as satellite mapping and surveillance technologies, as the military is often reluctant to share its images outside the official defense community.[35] If the past provides an insight into the future, limits will continue to be placed on access to such technology. Although recent innovations such as Google Earth have put satellite imagery into the hands of anyone with Internet access, the high-quality, time-sensitive images that the military uses—which can be crucial to response—are often out of reach for humanitarians.

This presents a difficult dilemma: although the military clearly has the potential to make a positive contribution to crisis management, this capacity may be constrained by internal security concerns and a "culture of classification."

The role of nonstate actors in complex emergencies will similarly challenge military participation in crisis management. Many of the military's long-standing humanitarian programs, such as DPMA, depend on official agreements with governments and humanitarian organizations. But the military, like much of the U.S. government, is prohibited from direct contact with certain nonstate actors who have stood out as de facto relief providers, such as Hezbollah.[36]

These actors may be key to future emergencies, but prohibitions on contact extend to U.S. military and government partners, including U.S. subsidiaries of humanitarian organizations. If humanitarian actors feel they must choose between working with key local actors and employing effective innovations, it will considerably blunt the efficacy of military contributions.[37]

These constraints should be kept in mind, but they should not distract from the enormous potential of the military's innovative capacity. This study groups this potential in four clusters, reflecting the best of past practices and prospects for the future.

1. Operational capacities

Forty-eight hours after news of the 2004 tsunami broke, PACOM had mobilized an impressive emergency response task force that coordinated the deployment of

- 16,000 U.S. military personnel,

34. This has been suggested by notable scholars, including James Schear of National Defense University. See appendix B for a draft NSPD.

35. Interview, March 19, 2007.

36. This example can also be extended to the case of warlords providing basic services in areas without formal government.

37. Interview, October 30, 2006.

- two dozen ships,
- more than 100 aircraft (including 60 helicopters),
- six maritime prepositioning ships (each storing 90,000 gallons of water and producing 36,000 additional gallons everyday), and
- P-3 Orion search and rescue overflight operations.

This complex response was organized through a Combined Coordination Center, established to coordinate international relief efforts with liaison officers from Australia, Canada, India, and Japan, among others. The speed with which such a massive volume of assets and resources was brought to bear on a relief operation is unparalleled and demonstrates the unique contribution of the U.S. military to major relief efforts.

The tight organization that guided this highly complex operation contrasted sharply with the often anarchic response of loosely organized humanitarian groups, who arrived in affected areas in record numbers, but largely without any real coherence of action.[38] One practitioner aptly described this situation as a humanitarian "gold rush."[39]

In addition, the communication capacities of the military, including satellite imagery and monitoring, can provide real-time analysis of the health requirements of the affected as well as details of their living conditions. The potential "tool box" that the U.S. military could employ is staggering. From mobile power systems that do not require conventional fuels to unmanned aerial vehicles, the military's capacities for influencing humanitarian innovation is considerable.

Toward that end, the U.S. military will have to commit itself to adding humanitarian applications to the specifications of the research it funds (see *Research and development* below).

2. Research and development

Of the $439.5 billion budgeted for DOD expenditures in FY 2007, $73 billion is devoted to research and development, testing, and evaluations.[40] The military's research and development agenda spans an enormous range of opportunities that could address issues of humanitarian assistance, although there is currently little specific orientation toward crisis management. Much of the research funding is channeled directly to the Services or independent agencies with specific focuses, such as the Missile Defense Agency.

One agency within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that is tasked with high-risk research activities has numerous potential applications for crisis management. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) houses six main offices and is responsible for developing new technologies for use by the military. With $3.1 billion in FY 2007 funding,[41] part of DARPA's mission is to undertake research where "risk and payoff are both very high."[42] As a result, DARPA invests in areas that may be considered too uncertain by the private sector and certainly too expensive for humanitarians. The focus of each of DARPA's six main offices could have tremendous applications to humanitarian work if there were a system that could filter relevant discoveries to humanitarians (see box 1).

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38. TEC, *Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami*.
39. Correspondence, September 5, 2007.
40. See http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007. The total DOD budget does not include supplemental spending used to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
41. See http://www.darpa.mil/body/budg.html.
42. See http://www.darpa.mil.

Box 1. Main Offices of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

Defense Sciences Office (DSO) is the most technologically diverse and investigates a wide range of "radically new" technologies. Major research areas include physical sciences, materials, mathematics, training and human effectiveness, biology, and biological warfare defenses. The broad mandate of this office has several applications to humanitarian work. These include a focus on biology that funds research in complex tissue reconstruction, as well as the Training and Human Effectiveness program, which studies accelerated skill acquisition in complex environments.

Information Processing Technology Office (IPTO) is focused on creating cognitively aware informational systems capable of reasoning and learning. IPTO has tremendous applications for improving the way humanitarians process information and implement lessons in practice.

Information Exploitation Office (IEO) is tasked with applying emerging technology in service of DOD missions. There is enormous utility in dedicating a single office to reviewing the possible applications of new technologies, rather than relying on a series of professionals across independent offices. Much of IEO's research could be easily adapted to humanitarian purposes, including focuses on "Getting Situation Data into the Head of a Busy Warfighter" and "Obtaining Reliable Forensics in Cluttered Environments." One of the office's core missions is to provide a "force multiplier" to postconflict and stabilization missions—a key focus of crisis management.

Microsystems Nanotechnology Office (MNO) leads research on "integrated microsystems," which enhance abilities to sense, process, and act on data as part of a "platform on a chip." Highly portable, sophisticated data collection and processing technology could significantly improve response agility.

Strategic Technology Office (STO) focuses on technologies with a "global or theater-wide impact . . . that involve multiple Services." This office has enormous application to humanitarian work, as it is involved in applying technology to entire theaters of operation ("affected areas" for humanitarians), as well as in ensuring effective diffusion across the different services of the military. Individual projects are good candidates for adaptation to humanitarian situations as well–these include Seismic and Acoustic Vibration Imaging, Advanced Sensing Technologies, All Weather Sniper Scope, and others. With slight modifications, these programs could enhance the reach of responders, as well as early warning of certain catastrophes.

Tactical Technology Office (TTO) is charged with "high-risk, high-payoff advanced technology development of military systems, emphasizing the 'system' and 'subsystem' approach to the development of Aerospace Systems and Tactical Multipliers."

In addition to DARPA programs, there are other important research initiatives, including those concerned with health threats to U.S. forces, that could be translated into humanitarian uses. For example, a $9.4 million project investigating medical strategies for preventing, treating, assessing, and predicting the effects of ionizing radiation on humans[43] would have tremendous applications for helping humanitarians prepare for the effects of an earthquake in Central Asia that could rupture nuclear waste stores.[44]

The challenge for determining how such research can be used for humanitarian action depends on the extent to which military R&D can be linked to humanitarian action. This challenge further depends on how much energy the military is willing to spend on understanding the dynamics of current and future humanitarian crises.

The issue is not necessarily identifying individual developments that could have a positive impact on crisis management, as there are potentially hundreds of isolated candidates. Rather, it is more important to change the culture within military research communities so that they take humanitarian assistance into account in the course of their work. This will require building new structures that can stream applicable developments into humanitarian practice. A similar process already exists for the private sector (see box 2). Expanding "dual use" into "triple use" would be a useful strategy for enhancing cooperation across the humanitarian, military, and corporate sectors.

3. Strategic planning

Approaches to dealing with the dynamics of humanitarian crises relate to one of the military's greatest strengths: strategic planning. The U.S. military uses a variety of methods to plan, to "game," and to develop scenarios that enable it to develop clear ideas about long-term strategic objectives.

The U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Analysis Center (TRAC) is a case in point. Supporting the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRAC is an analysis agency that conducts research on potential military operations in order to inform decisions on issues facing the military. TRAC has a strategic horizon set between five and 15 years into the future, meaning that new threats are identified and analyzed long before they can become imminent. This contrasts with standard long-term planning in the private sector (three to five years),[45] and especially with humanitarian strategic planning, which typically does not exceed one year.[46]

The humanitarian sector presently lacks any real ability to commit to such exercises, mostly for want of both the necessary financial and human resources. Although almost all humanitarian agencies would like to commit to greater strategic planning, experience shows that resource constraints usually thwart the effort.[47] Yet the organized, long-run orientation of the military in

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43. Department of Defense Research and Development Descriptive Summaries for FY 2007, OSD Programs, reference 0603002D87, Medical Advanced Technology. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2007/dod-peds/index.html.

44. *Dimensions of Crisis Impacts: Humanitarian Needs by 2015* (London: Humanitarian Futures Programme, January 2007), 71–72.

45. See, for example, Chet C. Miller and Laura B. Cardinal, "Strategic Planning and Firm Performance: A Synthesis of More Than Two Decades of Research," *Academy of Management Journal* 37, no. 6 (December 1994): 1656.

46. This represents a general consensus among interviewees who discussed strategic planning.

47. It is important to recognize the efforts of various agencies, including the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Office of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), among others, in this area.

Box 2: Technology Transfer for Disaster Prevention and Response

Many governments own research and development (R&D) facilities that support the missions of specific departments and agencies. Funded by public money, these facilities generate technological innovations that benefit their government customers. Typical examples are national laboratories or research centers working for a country's armed forces, space agency, or government department or ministry. As these government-owned R&D organizations grow, governments seek ways to make additional use of the innovations they generate.

To this end, technology transfer mechanisms are created that enable public R&D organizations to license their technologies or to enter into technology development partnerships to meet the needs of the private sector. For example, the U.S. Congress in 1986 empowered government labs to enter into collaborative R&D agreements with companies looking for specific technology solutions. Some countries have even created mechanisms to help organizations from the private sector identify relevant technologies within government R&D facilities. The Federal Laboratories Consortium (FLC) is one such mechanism; U.S. companies can approach it with a request for expertise in a particular domain, and they are then introduced to the appropriate government R&D facility.

Technology transfer from the public sector holds great potential for the disaster prevention and response community. Expertise in areas such as search and rescue, wide-area surveillance, water purification, and critical care medicine exists in places like the U.S. Coast Guard R&D Center and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. NGOs and international organizations approach these facilities via the appropriate brokering entity (such as the FLC in the United States). At the same time, technology transfer to NGOs could be a way through which governments contribute to building national and international capacity in disaster prevention and relief. Governments could actively encourage—and fund—technology transfer initiatives from their R&D facilities to address critical capability gaps in the disaster response community.

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this instance provides a compelling model for an internationally supported humanitarian planning organization that could disseminate its findings across the humanitarian sector.

TRAC enjoys infinitely greater institutional support for strategic planning than the vast majority of humanitarian organizations.[48] By designating a similar structure for humanitarian planning, future crisis managers would be building more efficient, adaptive responses *before* they are needed, instead of developing ad hoc operations *after* a catastrophe has struck.

48. The overwhelming majority of interviewees indicated that they would prefer to dedicate more resources toward strategic planning but were unable to do so because of either a lack of money or tied funding, which prohibits nonprogrammatic spending.

The 1993 designation of TRAC as a federal lab could signal a possible learning partnership between TRAC and the humanitarian sector, as federal labs "partner with public and private organizations in order for knowledge and capabilities to be shared for the greater good."[49] Using TRAC's experience in the creation of a similar structure for the global humanitarian sector would significantly enhance the sector's ability to plan strategically, as well as implement those plans uniformly.

4. Planning-operational linkages

As von Moltke noted, the uncertainty of the "fog of war" makes the relationship between grand strategy and operations problematic. Nevertheless, the military has developed various ways to promote greater alignment between strategic objectives and operational implementation. These reflect a combination of innovation and training, as well as a more clearly defined hierarchy that can mandate uniform changes across the organization.

Although the diverse humanitarian sector is unlikely to reproduce the hierarchy that facilitates alignment in the military, humanitarians could adopt some of the institutional learning practices that inform those changes. After-action reviews (AARs) are a key example. Although humanitarian organizations frequently engage in "lessons-learned" exercises, these evaluations often take the form of a report that lacks a clear path to implementation. AARs, by contrast, envision a dynamic process of review that occurs throughout the life of an operation, as opposed to a post-event accounting of what went right and wrong.[50] The AAR approach centers around written reports, as well as meetings and dialogue.

By institutionalizing these reviews (whether formally or informally) *during* an operation, the military creates a culture in which planning is aggressively questioned, as all members involved know they will have to account for their successes (and failures) during a subsequent AAR. By conducting these sessions regularly, an operation is able to become increasingly adaptive during implementation. This offers a useful alternative to completing an operation—and only then examining its strengths and weaknesses.

AARs cannot be grafted wholesale from the military into the humanitarian sector. Like all the potential innovations discussed in this chapter, AARs will require specific adaptations to be practicable in a sector that has very diffuse organization, limited resources, and a necessarily different outlook. Addressing the challenge of innovation is the focus of the next chapter.

49. TRAC Web site, http://www.trac.army.mil.

50. Marilyn Darling, Charles Parry, and Joseph Moore, "Learning in the Thick of It," *Harvard Business Review* (July/August 2005).

4 THE CHALLENGES OF INNOVATION

The two propositions driving this study are (1) future crises will overwhelm the humanitarian sector's present response capacities, and (2) one of the most pressing challenges for the sector today is learning how to deal with tomorrow. The factors intensifying human vulnerability are increasing significantly, and the potential devastation wrought by future crises could have catastrophic effects on human life, infrastructures, and livelihoods.

On the other hand, innovation—scientific, technological, and political—presents significant opportunities to mitigate the worst effects of crisis, as well as to enhance global response capacity. Implementing innovation, however, requires a revision of humanitarian response, including a re-evaluation of what constitutes a humanitarian actor and new approaches to relief delivery.

From the perspective of American capacities, this re-evaluation will increasingly require partnerships between the corporate sector, the military, and U.S. and international humanitarian agencies. The participation of all these communities is essential if the United States is to maximize its impact on enhancing international crisis management.

The United States is currently a global leader in terms of public and private response to crises, and this leadership is important to maintain for three reasons. First, U.S. concern for the crisis-affected is an international statement of American values. Second, U.S. humanitarian leadership is needed to protect American interests from future crises that will transcend borders. Finally, effective leadership on humanitarian issues has significant potential to boost American prestige around the world.

Identifying Operational Synergies across Sectors

The United States can begin to close some gaps identified in chapter 1 by promoting changes in the manner in which humanitarian assistance is provided. If correctly applied, the corporate and military practices described in this study could support a more robust U.S. contribution to international crisis management.

The challenge for many humanitarian organizations, however, is to accept that innovative practices are not "quick-fix solutions" but are instead opportunities for permanent improvements to response systems. Conversely, participating organizations outside the humanitarian sector must ensure that their contributions to response do not undermine humanitarian principles. A useful starting point for establishing such practices is identifying key areas where corporate and military strengths are best adapted to improving humanitarian practice. Five such areas are discussed below, and specific programmatic recommendations follow in the subsequent chapter.

1. Developing strategic capacities

Both the corporate world and the military invest a great deal of resources in strategic analysis. War-gaming, simulations, profit projections, and scenario development exercises are some of the tools for developing an understanding of strategic end-states.

Military planning capacities are sustained by a combination of information networks, an institutional commitment to strategic planning, and planning procedures that are unparalleled in most nonmilitary organizations. The military approach to planning includes detailed planning horizons spanning between 10 and 20 years.

The corporate sector is also a leader in strategic planning. Key corporate representatives interviewed for this study underscored the importance that leading multinationals accord to long-term planning. Although detailed planning typically exists at the three- to five-year range, a considerable amount of senior management time is often devoted to more general scenario development and simulations along a 20- and even 50-year timeframe.[1]

In both the corporate and military communities, planning exercises also encourage a team-building process that forges a sense of common purpose around future objectives. This process requires collaboration across institutional lines in bringing fresh ideas forward, which could serve as a useful model for the humanitarian sector.

The challenge is determining how private sector and military strategic capacities can be leveraged into humanitarian practice, which typically does not engage in detailed planning beyond a one- to three-year time horizon. Humanitarian planning is also often limited to individual agencies rather than across the sector.[2]

The development of joint modeling programs in which military and corporate inputs are brought to bear on humanitarian planning initiatives would be a useful first step. This will require cultural changes among all communities at the institutional level, however. As one senior representative from a major private sector organization noted, the military must become "increasingly collaborative and increasingly adaptive"[3] in order for its approach to planning to have a meaningful impact beyond the military.

Despite imperfections, military and corporate sector organizations both recognize the value in speculation and devote far greater resources to anticipating the future than does the humanitarian sector. Humanitarian organizations largely lack this strategic orientation, despite an (at least) equal need to adapt to shifting conditions.

2. Research and development

Military and corporate research and development practices diverge sharply from the humanitarian norm and could be of significant value to humanitarian organizations.

Again, the issue is how to leverage these practices into the humanitarian community. "Dual use" analysis (see box 2 in chapter 3) could prove a step in the right direction through adaptation of these channels to include humanitarian input and applications. Such an approach could facilitate the development, promotion, and dissemination of "products" among crisis managers that could strengthen humanitarian response.

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1. Conversely, although a number of corporations engage in long-term scenario exercises and speculative planning, detailed timeframes are generally limited to three to five years. This is by no means true for all companies, although one leading international consultant observed that most managers in the corporate sector actually rail against speculating about what might be and prefer to work within a "binary view of uncertainty." Hugh Courtney, *20/20 Foresight: Crafting Strategy in an Uncertain World* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001).

2. This point was repeatedly raised in project interviews.

3. IBM Global Business Services, *On the Move: Advancing Military Logistics toward Sense-and-Response* (New York: IBM Global Services, 2006), 3.

Ideally, a specific mechanism consisting of the humanitarian, military, and corporate sectors could be developed, shifting "dual use" research to "triple use." By sponsorship through the research arm of the military, new and existing developments could be further adapted and promoted by the private sector and, finally, made available to all actors concerned with humanitarian response.

This strategy is particularly useful for exploring initiatives that the humanitarian sector could not afford to underwrite independently and that the private sector might find too costly in terms of research costs and expected profit returns. This example is best illustrated by the Plumpy'nut case (see chapter 2); the Plumpy'nut experience could be conceivably replicated by pooling the comparative advantages of the humanitarian, military, and corporate sectors in research, development, and application. Newer tools are emerging to link problems and potential solutions, such as the recent trend in broadcast searches among some corporations.[4]

The resources of the military here could be key to success. Although the military was not involved with Plumpy'nut, there are many instances in which it possesses the margins to invest in risky research and development, as demonstrated in chapter 3. Incorporating humanitarian input into the research process would result in more military technology being flagged for humanitarian uses. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for example, could be used to monitor the flow of displaced persons, to assess water tables and crop developments, and to evaluate the health of crisis-affected peoples via telemedicine. UAVs and telemedicine are both firmly within military capabilities, but they have largely not filtered down to humanitarian organizations, which lack the resources to reproduce their own models.

3. Innovation and implementation

Humanitarian organizations are often slow to revise their traditional orientations, even concerning new practices that could enhance their work. Implementing innovation is difficult for many institutions, particularly for groupings of diverse organizations such as the humanitarian sector. Nonetheless, this challenge is regularly met by the military and private corporations, both of which are part of diverse larger communities.

Yet, humanitarian organizations have increasingly had to integrate a range of innovations that already affect their operating environments. For example, operations have been significantly influenced by the emergence of food and health security insurance in vulnerable societies, and these initiatives are gaining increasing traction within the sector.[5] Advances in mobile phone technology and their numerous applications have also influenced the behavior patterns of many "peasant farmers," further influencing how humanitarians can best deliver assistance.[6]

Global crisis management could be significantly enhanced through promotion of institutional learning and innovation practices. Increasing humanitarians' exposure to communities that regularly confront these issues could aid in developing a culture of innovation within the humanitarian

4. A broadcast search presents specific problems (mainly from the corporate sector) to open competitions with financial rewards. This method broadens the available expertise beyond involved experts and easily leverages multiple areas of specialization. Some Internet-based companies specialize in linking expert pools to corporations, such as Innocentive.

5. Some examples include a recent World Bank project to provide Caribbean governments with immediate post-hurricane liquidity through the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility. See also recent UN World Food Programme (WFP) participation with AXA Re in piloting humanitarian insurance in Ethiopia, http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=2030.

6. See Nicole Itano, "Africa's Cellphone Boom Creates a Base for Low-Cost Banking," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 26, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0826/p07s01-woaf.html.

sector. This exposure would be a natural by-product of collaborative research and development structures as described above.

4. Program management

A former USAID administrator recently remarked that he was tired of calls for greater coordination and simply wished that humanitarian organizations could be more effective at program management.[7] Poor program management partially reflects the lack of strategic vision that should guide humanitarian operational activities, but it also reflects poor information management and ineffective operational integration. In a relief operation that should be managed as a single program, for example, it is not unusual to find food and health inputs being administered separately, with little recognition of their inherent relation to one another. This extends to the issue of incompatible assessment tools and numerous layers of administration for what should be treated as a single task. In this case, there is enormous potential for the integration of Web 2.0 tools in humanitarian practice, which is taken up in more detail below.[8]

There is no doubt that humanitarian organizations are confronted with extremely complex operations, often under trying conditions. Both the private sector and the military face complexity in their operations, but their approaches to program management often result in more focused action. For example, manufacturing companies' management of myriad components, different staffing and managerial expertise, and marketing and dissemination issues, as well as quality control concerns, could strengthen humanitarian organizations' program management competencies if there were a forum in which they could exchange ideas.[9]

The humanitarian sector could also benefit from the military's "sense and respond" capabilities under this heading.[10] Military imperatives make it essential to have systems that can consistently monitor complex situations, identify requirements, assess impact, and avoid duplication of effort. These techniques are adapted to conditions that often mirror those faced by humanitarian actors, but humanitarians often lack a systematic approach to adjusting their resources, logistics, and needs under "battlefield" conditions, at least partially as a result of tied funding that prohibits such flexibility.

5. Learning lessons

Humanitarian organizations expend great effort in capturing "lessons learned," as well as in attempting to develop these lessons into standards. The consensus among practitioners, however, is that "lessons learned" do not consistently affect subsequent responses.[11] This partially reflects the institutional separation between evaluators and decisionmakers, as well as donor reluctance to fund many of the recommendations that come out of postresponse evaluations.

The U.S. military employs after-action reviews (AARs) to implement lessons learned immediately following operations (see chapter 3). The significance of such reviews is two-fold. First,

7. Interview, January 30, 2007.

8. See also Rebecca Linder, *Wikis, Webs, and Networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings* (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, October 2006).

9. CSIS is preparing a project that would organize a workshop for senior managers from the military, corporate, and humanitarian sectors on how to innovate in large organizations and how to leverage innovations across and outside "home organizations."

10. See, for example, IBM Global Business Services, *On the Move.*

11. Interviews, January 30–February 2, 2007.

AARs are the result of assessments that lead to mandatory operational adjustments and require rapid, demonstrable implementation. Second, AARs frequently designate a specific official to be responsible for implementation. By publicly tasking one person with the responsibility to follow up, greater accountability is established for institutional learning.[12]

The corporate sector also has useful strategies for implementing "lessons-learned," particularly when these lessons can be clearly tied to profit and loss. For example, the creation of interdepartmental ad hoc teams to implement consultant reports is one measure used to ensure that the recommendations of expensive consultancy firms do not go awry. These ad hoc teams often include representatives from the evaluating group, creating a personnel link between recommendation and implementation. Such practices could have a positive impact on humanitarian institutional learning, and a first step could be the organization of a workshop for senior management of the military, private, and humanitarian sectors on new innovation methodologies and tools.[13]

Moving Ideas into Practice

The operational synergies outlined above give some indication of how military and corporate experiences could strengthen global crisis management and close some existing operational gaps. These synergies most closely relate to gaps in three priority areas: strategic planning, operational coherence, and adapting to innovations and institutional transformations. Specific programmatic recommendations for action in these areas follow in the next chapter.

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12. Marilyn Darling, Charles Parry, and Joseph Moore, "Learning in the Thick of It," *Harvard Business Review* (July/Augsust2005).

13. Ibid., 136.

5 RECOMMENDATIONS

Identifying priority areas is useful but cannot alone produce the exponential increase in capacity that will be required to confront future crises. That increase—including expertise, resources, and innovations—needs to be seen from a broad structural and institutional perspective. Nonetheless, responding to these initial priority areas will construct a useful foundation for further improvements.

When making recommendations for humanitarian practice, it can be difficult to be sure of the intended audience, and the lack of a clear "home" for cross-cutting initiatives is part of the problem. These recommendations represent a four-point strategy for using humanitarian, corporate, and military strengths to close key gaps in international response. The success of these initiatives will depend partially on institutional changes in the humanitarian response architecture, as well as on specific actions of the U.S. government. Both of these issues are addressed in chapter 6.

1. Create integrated operational mapping and early warning systems.

The rapidly evolving needs of a crisis situation require continuous systems for information gathering and mapping, as well as for regular testing of capacities against different threat scenarios. Although numerous approaches currently exist to address these needs, the lack of a common standard is an impediment to their success, and current models do not draw sufficiently from external sources.

Integrated operational mapping and early warning would combine a variety of tools in order to anticipate and distribute responsibilities in vulnerable situations before a crisis occurs. These tools focus on identifying potential geographic, socioeconomic, and human risks in areas of recognized vulnerability. This approach requires the participation of official relief providers (i.e., those under government or UN control), as well as corporate partners.

Official relief providers

"Official" relief providers include both traditional (humanitarian agencies) and nontraditional (military) actors whose behavior can be determined by official policy. The advantage here is that integration of existing models can be compelled by changes in policy.

The most essential requirement for effective mapping is the availability of sound, timely information. The technical capacity of surveillance mechanisms (such as satellite imagery) to monitor risks has been discussed, and this capacity is highly relevant to mapping the probability and consequences of risk, provided the military becomes more willing to make its imagery available and the private sector (see bulleted entry *Corporate partners*, below) wishes to partner with humanitarians.

Of the humanitarian early warning systems in existence, the U.S. Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) is among the most highly regarded. The program charts short-term climatic changes,

tracks potential drought and famine conditions, and incorporates livelihoods analysis into its data. By building on this program, the United States could enhance global crisis management capability by refining the information on which contingency planning is based.

FEWS is one of several institutions in the United States that offer analysis of such trends; other such organizations include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which has developed a focus on climate change as one of its key strategic objectives over the next five years[1] and, through the National Weather Service, manages the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center.

These programs have tremendous individual utility, and the United States should extend their operational focus and work to embed them into existing international warning systems, particularly the United Nations' Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWSweb). Aggregating the single thematic focuses of various U.S. models into HEWSweb, which aims to provide broad-based early warning but has relatively few non-UN partners,[2] would enhance both the effectiveness of the UN early warning platform as well as the reach of existing U.S. efforts. Centralizing this information would also simplify the work of crisis managers, some of whom cited the "information overload" that results from having numerous early warning systems—a factor that can be a significant handicap when decisions must be made quickly.[3]

Three main strategies could support the integration of demonstrated U.S. capacity for early warning into an integrated international system. First, U.S. officials should ensure that the myriad climate-focused early warning systems are consistent and that they offer actionable information. From discussions with practitioners, it is evident that although some details and predictions are omitted by present early warning systems, the systems could be readily adjusted. Practitioners also remarked that essential information was available but frequently failed the tests of timeliness and precision.[4]

Second, the United States should use its present monitoring capacities, including open-source intelligence and selectively declassified intelligence, to strengthen early warning and monitoring of complex emergencies. The U.S. government has taken some steps in this direction, notably with the creation of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, as well as several USAID and CIA models.[5] Still, none of these efforts has received broad support, and none has gained wide acceptance across the government.

Finally, an integrated early warning system can provide a powerful, coherent motivation to move to early action. Key to this transition is a clear understanding of respective roles and responsibilities in a crisis, which forms the next recommendation (see recommendation 2).

Corporate partners

Corporate partners cannot be compelled by government order to participate in integrated approaches to operational mapping and early warning, but experience suggests that corporations

1. See http://www.noaa.gov/str-plan/planCover.html.
2. Non-UN partners of HEWSweb include the U.S. Geological Survey, Dartmouth Flood Observatory, Smithsonian Institution, International Crisis Group, International Volcano Research Centre, and Tropical Storm Risk at University College London. See http://www.hewsweb.org.
3. Interview, November 20, 2006.
4. Interview, November 21, 2006.
5. Early warning of complex emergencies is highly complex, and numerous models exist in government and research institutions. For a discussion of the relative utility of over 30 open-source early warning models dedicated to conflict, see Cohen, *A Perilous Course*, appendix D, 97–101.

are open to working with humanitarian actors at the request of senior leaders and under a well-defined mandate.[6]

Satellite surveillance, whether from the military or corporations,[7] and intelligence community estimates do not alone offer a complete picture of vulnerability. Information from official sources could be significantly augmented by socioeconomic analysis coming from global financial risk analysis and leading reinsurance corporations, such as Munich Re, Swiss Re, and Sovereign Risk Insurance, Ltd., some of which already have established expertise in crisis risk management.[8]

These companies have all done tremendous advance work in identifying a range of risks (both natural and man-made), as well as estimating individual area vulnerabilities. Convincing them to share some of this information with humanitarian practitioners could significantly enrich the knowledge base from which crisis management activities are planned.

The corporate sector can also offer critical assistance in sorting and managing disparate data in order to create user-friendly, aggregated interfaces. The United States is home to data management capacities, such as Google, that could help develop and maintain a broad-based operational mapping system. In addition, a series of recent innovations in the United States has been successful in creating user-driven, "go-to" repositories of information, such as Wikipedia, as well as social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, MySpace) that create communities across diverse populations.[9] A critical component of this challenge would be to persuade those within this sector to collaborate in areas outside their traditional focus, although there is strong evidence that such collaboration is possible.[10]

Through leveraging the inspirational power of the United Nations or the U.S. government, such companies could conceivably be convinced to share their information with crisis managers to support specific humanitarian capacity-building objectives as a means of improving future response operations.

2. Create a precrisis matrix that assigns response roles and responsibilities.

The main purpose of an integrated early warning system is to translate warning into action. If developed simultaneously, roles previously agreed upon for various actors could support the

6. The five CEOs who led the South Asia Earthquake Relief Fund did so at President Bush's urging, demonstrating the potential of the government to inspire corporate sector behavior in the face of extreme conditions.

7. Private sector satellite companies have demonstrated some willingness in this area; for example, by offering discounts on archived imagery to the American Association for the Advancement of Science's human rights program.

8. Munich Re America, for example, has a separate Catastrophe Risk Management department that focuses on covering business exposures against natural and other crises. See "Catastrophe Risk Management" at http://www.munichreamerica.com.

9. Linder, *Wikis, Webs, and Networks*.

10. Google has already shown interest in contributing to crisis management. It was the first funder of INSTEDD (International Networked System for Total Early Disease Detection), which is an evolving organization with interests in a broad spectrum of crisis management issues. See video presentation on INSTEDD at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8969496433968238169. In addition, all three of the Google.org (Google's philanthropic arm) main action areas are relevant to crisis management: climate change, public health, and global development. See http://www.google.org.

integrated early warning system through devising of concise, actionable plans for vulnerable areas before these cases are identified as imminent crises. In short, the integrated early warning system would act as a trigger for implementing plans developed within a "response roles and responsibilities matrix" (RRR matrix). A key aspect of these plans would involve immediate stock reviews of a virtual warehouse (see recommendation 3), as well as strategies for moving relief to the target area. By delivering an immediate, coherent road map from warning to action, these mechanisms will greatly simplify the initial planning process, as well as provide a core strategy around which to rally political support.

With this in mind, the RRR matrix would need to be developed in collaboration with corporate, military, and humanitarian organizations willing to commit themselves in advance to specific actions in times of crisis.

The RRR matrix would be based on the probability of crises in identified zones of vulnerability and would be developed by relevant governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as with new partners (see recommendation 4). Building on the vulnerabilities identified through integrated operational mapping, the RRR matrix would establish clear responsibilities for a wide spectrum of activities and partners, including information sharing, joint response assessments, coordination of locations and processes, logistics support, and operational implementation.

The United Nations has taken initial steps toward developing this sort of matrix with the recent introduction of the "predictable leadership," or "cluster," initiative. This initiative groups expert agencies within nine operational areas to provide a more coherent interagency response to crises. Still, the cluster approach does not draw on the full spectrum of potential responders and does not engage in specific pre-event planning. The proposed RRR matrix would be regionally specific, would draw on a wider group of actors, and would be responsible for testing a range of response scenarios through regular response exercises. The results of these exercises would be the subject of real-time evaluations, implemented along the lines of the military's after-action review process (see chapter 3).

An RRR matrix pilot phase could initially focus on areas with high vulnerability to natural disasters, which involve more straightforward planning and inspire fewer political obstacles. As the methodology is refined, the matrix could be extended to encompass a more global analysis, as well as more complex crises. Finally, the RRR matrix initiative would draw on a "collaborative pool" of participants that comprise the institutional architecture described in chapter 6.

3. Create a virtual warehouse of relief supplies that transcends institutional lines.

Warehousing in the twenty-first century is as much a virtual concept as a physical entity. The issue is no longer ensuring that all necessary goods are in a single location, but rather knowing where vital response goods—based on recommendations of the RRR Matrix—are distributed and how they can best be transported in a time of need.

Constructing an *online virtual warehouse* would centralize this information without requiring the physical relocation of countless tons of relief supplies. In addition, "tagging" information with specific indicators (e.g., "winter-ready") in a searchable database could reduce the incidence of inappropriate aid that occurs under ad hoc arrangements. When it comes to shelter, for example, the availability of winterized tents is essential in some areas, but not in others. A virtual warehouse

could speed the location of winterized tents, flag their appropriateness for a given situation, and estimate their availability in terms of accessible stocks.

Ideally, the virtual warehouse would be directly linked to corporate and military research and development mechanisms in order to ensure that technology transferred to humanitarian use would be both "cutting edge" and tracked for availability. This effort would differ from earlier attempts to implement tracking programs within individual agencies in that it would be accessible to *all* the stakeholders in crisis management, rather than limited to implementing organizations.

With the input of local authorities, the virtual warehouse could also serve as an inventory of locally-available products and services. This inventory could expand the role of local ingenuity in response operations, as well as reduce the social and economic distortions that often accompany external interventions.

The utility of the virtual warehouse will ultimately depend on the willingness of suppliers and users to manage it autonomously, transparently, and efficiently. Sponsorship by the United Nations and major donor governments, such as the United States, could give the virtual warehouse enough cachet to quickly become a center of gravity. The success of other user-driven online models, such as Wikipedia, suggests that such efforts can become self-regulating tools for information management,[11] and the low overhead and decentralized model that the virtual warehouse provides is a good fit for the diffuse humanitarian sector.

4. Create a dedicated forum for global humanitarian research and analysis.

The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) offers an interesting model for U.S. involvement in humanitarian response by suggesting that wide consensus on trends can catalyze important changes.[12] The IPCC experience was remarkable because of the diverse constituency that drove it: official government representatives, UN agencies, scientists, international organizations, academic institutions, and other concerned bodies. This resulted in a long, often contentious process that periodically produced suboptimal results. Yet the end result was successful, and only a few hard-line critics would deny that the net result was an important agreement on the existence of a major global threat and provided initial suggestions for solutions.

The relevance of the IPCC initiative for future humanitarian crises lies chiefly in its ability to transcend any individual set of organizations. Similar approaches are needed to generate interest not only in future humanitarian threats, but in guiding the research that could mitigate these threats.

The United States should recognize the success of the IPCC process as a means of anticipating future humanitarian threats and promoting appropriate action. A similar forum for crisis management could address some of the essential tasks, such as strategic planning and forecasting, that the current humanitarian sector has difficulty implementing. By creating a dedicated institution to research these issues, this forum could solicit a broader base of input than what currently informs humanitarian decisionmaking, which could further integrate military and corporate perspectives into response.

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11. Linder, *Wikis, Webs, and Networks*.

12. The IPCC process began in 1988, and its multistakeholder approach to long, careful research has played a significant role in shifting the global consensus on the existence and origin of climate change, even within the U.S. government.

Although there are clear complementarities among the proposed global humanitarian research and analysis forum, the RRR matrix, the virtual warehouse, and the integrated early warning system, a key issue will be determining how to structure such innovations from an institutional point of view. Namely, what institutional architecture can bring them together so as to best apply American capacity to meet global humanitarian challenges?

6 INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

When faced with complex challenges, it is easy to resort to proposing new structures, creating additional official bodies, or strengthening existing departments in place of offering substantive solutions. In the course of this study, however, it has become impossible to avoid the need to devise a "home" for the various initiatives that have emerged, a fact regularly underscored during practitioner interviews. Institutional organization is a useful prism through which to organize numerous individual "ideas," and it would be difficult to implement the innovations in this study without embedding them in a structure that would permit their further development.

Practical institutional strategies are needed to foster an integrated approach to humanitarian response in the future. The necessary architecture must link global and regional institutions with those of states, and to be successful, this architecture will require the full commitment of the United States.

Underlying Institutional Assumptions

Three assumptions underlie the architecture that could initiate the innovations outlined in this study. First, the role of international institutions will continue to be highly important for implementing these proposals. That said, there will have to be fundamental changes in the role and responsibilities of many of these institutions, as described below. Second, "nontraditional" actors—the private sector and the military—must gain equal representation in any new response architecture that seeks to implement innovations.

Finally, the role of the United States is essential, both for its own interests and those of the wider international system. This means that the United States will need to re-examine the structures that ensure its national interests through a humanitarian lens, as well as through those of the wider global community. This will require a range of structural changes in the American national security apparatus, as well as renewed advocacy at the international level.

1. The Role of International Institutions

Despite the myriad criticisms leveled against the United Nations, the UN remains a uniquely global organization with considerable expertise and worldwide access. These features are reflected in the current UN humanitarian architecture. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), with all its strengths and weaknesses, is generally acknowledged to be the international community's "relief coordinator." In principle, OCHA can call on the various components of the UN system to address needs in times of complex emergencies and disasters. OCHA has also found ways to work more closely with nongovernmental organizations to promote response coherence.

Over the years, the international community has called upon the United Nations to deal with the full range of global crises. As a result, the UN has promoted the active exchange of information through initiatives such as IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Network), HICs (humanitarian information centers), HOCs (humanitarian operations centers), and HCCs (humanitarian communication centers). More recently, the UN has promoted linkages between the military and humanitarian organizations as well as private-public partnerships in humanitarian response.

Despite these important efforts, the UN humanitarian role has frequently been regarded as suboptimal. Two main reasons drive this perception. First, the United Nations has never had a role that reflected its true comparative advantage and value added, which lies in its global reach and credibility. These categories include strategic oversight, facilitation, assessments and evaluations, monitoring, and advocacy. Second, the UN has never had the scale to adequately perform the functions that would capitalize on its comparative advantages.

Although the United States possesses the innovative capacities to enhance global crisis response, the architecture of a truly global response system cannot depend on the exigencies of a single actor. The United Nations therefore needs to be structured in ways that will most effectively use U.S. capacities (and those of other countries) for humanitarian response. Toward that end, the United Nations requires a more precisely defined role, as well as the capacity to fulfill that role. Three steps are required to achieve these objectives.

The UN as a "standard-bearer"

The dynamics of future crises will require a global actor that is perceived to be impartial and that can assess the effectiveness of humanitarian response. As presently configured, the UN is both an implementer of aid and a promoter of humanitarian values. These two roles often clash: the first compels it to compete for resources with other humanitarian actors, whereas the second depends on the UN's being perceived as above the day-to-day operational fray.

The United Nations must become a "standard bearer" that ensures the appropriate delivery of assistance across a wide range of crises. This role more accurately reflects the UN's value added, and a focus on promoting standards, monitoring, and evaluation could allow the UN to act without fear of accusations of self-interest. Moving to a standard-bearer model means that the UN's capacity for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation must be supported, at both headquarters and field levels. Without such a shift in focus, the UN's value added will continue to be suboptimal. Such an outcome is ultimately not in the interest of the United States, which will need a partner with global access in order to ensure adequate response to future catastrophes.

The UN as a promoter and monitor

One important reason for enhancing the standard-bearer role of the United Nations is to ensure that initiatives such as the RRR matrix, the virtual warehouse, the integrated early warning system, and the global humanitarian research facility are actively promoted. The UN should act as a facilitator of these initiatives, ensuring their effective implementation and functioning. Beneficiaries of these programs would include implementing organizations, whereas the UN would phase itself out of its own implementing role.

As described below, these initiatives would function as "collaborative pools" with all stakeholders having responsibility for reporting on the progress of each program. The UN would be responsible for monitoring and evaluating the success of each but would not be involved in day-to-day operations. Operationalizing and managing these initiatives would be the responsibility of

the participating collaborative pools, but reporting on their overall effectiveness would be the role of "the standard-bearer."

The UN as an advocate for innovation

Although the global humanitarian research facility would be outside the UN bureaucracy, the results of its work could give the United Nations the substance it requires for advocating for innovative practices; forecasting future vulnerability; and promoting long-term prevention, preparedness, and response measures within the humanitarian sector. In other words, the UN would play a major advocacy role for innovation, long and short-term early warning, and good humanitarian practices.

This role re-emphasizes the importance of an impartial global standard bearer. The critical functions of innovation and advocacy over a wide spectrum of humanitarian concerns will require a voice that cannot be accused of self-interest. Structuring the UN humanitarian architecture so that these initiatives can be "of" the UN but not "in" the UN presents an important challenge.

The UN's humanitarian structure for the future

This study has come to the conclusion that a senior position within the U.S. government is necessary to coordinate American capacity to respond to future crises (see the next chapter). A parallel effort is necessary for the United Nations. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has served adequately to date, but the dynamics of future crises will require a more robust coordination system.

This coordination mechanism must be able to rely consistently on the immediate availability of the UN system's diverse humanitarian capacities. The various humanitarian arms of UN agencies should be directly available to an undersecretary-general (USG) responsible for a humanitarian department. Agency and program heads will then report directly to the USG on all matters pertaining to humanitarian prevention, preparedness, and response. The voluntarism that sustains coordination today should be replaced with a more vigorous approach that approximates command and control.

OCHA is the result of a reduced Department of Humanitarian Affairs following the UN's 1997 reform process. This reduction was a mistake, and in UN terms, the strength and authority of a department is now needed. A restored Department of Humanitarian Affairs must have a clear and prioritized mandate, however—one based on the standard-bearer model. The challenge will be integrating this department into the United Nations without subjecting it to a potentially paralyzing bureaucracy.

In this case, the Department should be based on the looser model of the 1984 UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA). When it came to initiatives, flexible staffing, and funding, the OEOA was "of the system, but not in the system."[1] In other words, the proposed department will require considerable flexibility to fulfill its revised role and responsibilities. It cannot be

1. The Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) existed from 1984 to 1986. It was managed by senior UN officials but had the advantage of working independently of the Secretariat, both procedurally and administratively. Directors still had direct access to the Secretary-General, but its management and administrative staff were comprised of UN agencies as well as NGO representatives. The Office's principal focus was on coordination and advocacy. Although agencies were generally pleased to see the innovation come to an end at the time, various senior officials within the UN still regard the OEOA as a possible model for future flexibility.

constrained by standard UN operating procedures or conventional norms, given the magnitude of the challenges it will have to face, which will require innovation, creativity, and agility.[2]

2. New Organizational Approaches to Future Challenges: "Collaborative Pools"

Maximum flexibility, agility, and rapid adaptability will be essential characteristics of organizations dealing with future crises. In many instances, organizational consortia that pool resources for specific activities will be the most efficient future responders, particularly if these consortia can be reconfigured according to changing needs.

These "collaborative pools" will consist of various organizations brought together to meet specific goals and will bear many of the characteristics of ad hoc structures.[3] Operating rules will be flexible according to changing conditions, and membership will depend on functional requirements, as is the case, to some extent, with the IPCC.

Driving this concept is an emerging awareness within the corporate sector of the effectiveness of "open innovation collaboration," in which organizations function as open networks rather than discrete units. These networks are notable for the fact that they are "open-sourced" and often consist of organizations of different sizes and types. They thrive on information exchange and are experimental, adept at innovation, and committed to functional collaboration.[4] Simulating such an arrangement for the humanitarian sector would greatly enhance the sector's overall effectiveness without threatening the diversity of actors that participate.

The requirements for creating a successful virtual warehouse, integrated early warning system, and global humanitarian research forum depend on the humanitarian sector's ability to adopt the "open-sourced" characteristics above. None of these programs can be engineered as the sole domain of any single organization, and each requires a commitment to transparency and collaboration to be successful. It should be OCHA's responsibility to ensure that these collaboration pools are in place, although OCHA will have no direct responsibility for these programs' day-to-day operations. OCHA will report on their activities, their successes and failures, and will support them when required through resource promotion efforts and advocacy.

In addition, the RRR matrix requires similar commitments to openness, but it is probably more subject to the constraints faced by governments and regional organizations than the other initiatives. To be effective, the RRR matrix must have the full commitment of the member states and regional organizations in which analysis and exercises are to take place.

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2. There is in this regard a parallel with the greater flexibility given to the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), as compared with other offices within the U.S. Agency for International Development.

3. Some scholars refer to this organizational model as an "adhocracy," which can be defined as an organization that transcends bureaucratic boundaries in implementing its objectives without particular regard for institutional lines. See, for example, Robert H. Waterman, Jr., *Adhocracy: The Power to Change* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992).

4. Michael Lord, Donald Debethizy, and Jeffrey Wager, *Innovation That Fits: The Right Innovation Strategies for Your Business* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2005), 118.

3. The Role of the United States from an Institutional Perspective

In order to signal the sincerity of U.S. commitment to renewing international crisis management, the innovations outlined in this study and their related institutional architecture demand the support of the highest authority in the United States. The president of the United States should ensure that U.S. contributions to global humanitarian response are used in ways that reflect both global needs and American interests. These can best be achieved through two forms: a national security presidential directive and the creation of an executive-level office dedicated to crisis management.

National Security Presidential Directive

A national security presidential directive (NSPD) is necessary to ensure that executive measures required for more dynamic global humanitarian action are backed by the necessary authority and receive government-wide coherence, including advocating for structural change in the response architecture at the United Nations.

The pressing relationship between global humanitarian action and the national security of the United States has largely been recognized at the policy level.[5] Despite that recognition, standard government practices have not significantly shifted to incorporate this view. An NSPD would be helpful in advancing this process.

An NSPD would principally ensure that mechanisms are in place to enable all the relevant components of U.S. capacity to consider global humanitarian response. The success of such an initiative depends in part on the willingness of military, corporate, and humanitarian actors, but the political force behind an NSPD is likely to elicit greater openness to collaboration in all communities, including those beyond the official writ of the government.[6]

Assistant to the President for Humanitarian Response

Given the security implications of future humanitarian crises, there is a clear case for designating an official with regular presidential access to monitor the U.S. government's approach to crisis management. In order to confront the growing complexity and potential impact of future crises, humanitarian response efforts will require a voice at the executive level to be truly effective.

In recognition of the possible implications of crisis for national security, this official should be authorized to participate in relevant National Security Council meetings and should be directly subordinate to the national security adviser. Creation of the Office of the Deputy National Security Adviser for Humanitarian Response (DNSA/HR) should be taken up in the NSPD. This office will be tasked with monitoring the government's entire approach to humanitarian response, including working across the various agencies that currently have responsibility for different aspects of crisis.[7]

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5. *Quadrennial Defense Review*; DODD 3000.15.

6. The military and government would be legally obligated to implement the NSPD. The CEO-led South Asia Earthquake Relief Fund, begun at the urging of President Bush, demonstrates that the private sector has shown itself to be receptive to high-level entreaties to work on humanitarian issues.

7. For example, OFDA largely focuses on high-level crisis response, but the State Department's coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization does more political crisis monitoring. It would be useful to have a

Future crises will not be neatly divided between domestic and international policy. Hurricanes, for example, that rip across Mexico and southwestern regions of the United States would demand unparalleled coordination between FEMA and OFDA. A global pandemic such as H5N1 avian influenza could not be adequately managed without the participation of the Department of State, the Centers for Disease Control, and the Department of Homeland Security, in cooperation with relevant international organizations like the WHO. As crises burst across bureaucratic lines, it makes sense to task a high-ranking official with coordinating across relevant institutions in terms of prevention, preparedness, and response.

The designation of an assistant to the president for crisis management will send an unmistakable signal to the international community that it is time to adjust global thinking on this issue. The excellent work undertaken by OFDA and its supporting organizations within USAID cannot be ignored, but as currently constituted, USAID's humanitarian portfolio will not be adequate to meet coming challenges, and it can no longer remain an isolated subcomponent of the national government.[8]

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position that ensures that each office is on the same page and that there is a unified U.S. approach to crises.

8. During the course of this study, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development are undergoing a major foreign assistance reform initiative that would appear to strengthen the links between State Department objectives and those of USAID, including the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance. This study argues that such a move could isolate the types of integrated, intersectoral, and interregional disasters and emergencies that the United States and the global community will have to face in the future.

7 CONCLUSION

This study focuses on ways in which the relevant experiences of the corporate sector and the military can be brought to bear on some of the major gaps in humanitarian response. The major theme is structuring U.S. capacity in a way that will encourage a significant strengthening of the global ability to respond to crises—particularly the sort of crises that are likely to occur in the future. U.S. institutions—in government, the military, and the private sector—have enormous capabilities in or applications to crisis management. But no single country is equipped to confront all future humanitarian challenges alone. By integrating existing U.S. practices and new initiatives into the larger humanitarian sector, the United States will both enhance the global capacity to manage crises and contribute to greater world stability.

If the United States is willing to make this commitment, which this study argues is in the American national interest, then the humanitarian sector should prepare to see an expansion in regular participants to include military and corporate sector partners. Together, the capacities of the corporate, military, and humanitarian sectors can be leveraged to complement one another, with each sector drawing on its specific strengths.

U.S. support for these changes is critical to their success, which will require a greater mainstreaming of humanitarian issues in the U.S. policy community than presently exists. This support can be brought about via two main strategies: advocacy and diplomacy at the international level and domestic U.S. policy changes.

At the outset, however, these improvements require a genuine recognition in the United States that future humanitarian crises demand greater attention. Evidence shows that this idea has begun to penetrate key areas of the U.S. government. Corporate sector activity in this area also demonstrates a wider interest in these issues. The overwhelming objective here is to bring all the relevant communities together so that each can build off the strengths of the other, and so that major catastrophes can be averted.

APPENDIX A
GAPS IN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Appendix A expands on the information presented in chapter 1, offering a more detailed discussion about each of the five major gaps in humanitarian response: global perspectives, strategic planning, operational coherence, cultural awareness, and community coherence. It brings together some of the major points touched on during practitioner interviews and in the course of desk research.

Each heading offers specific points that were frequently raised by practitioners, as well as greater explanation of the origins and possible solutions of these gaps.

Global Perspectives Gap

- **Insufficient attention has been given to the role of new humanitarian actors.**

The increasing role of China in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, demonstrates that new geopolitical forces are affecting existing aid patterns.[1] These trends have begun to influence humanitarian assistance as well, and they have the potential to do so on a greater scale in the future.[2] The inability of many humanitarian organizations to confront these changes reflects three major shortcomings: an inadequate understanding of their consequences, a lack of operational flexibility to adjust to new conditions, and political constraints that encourage nonreactions.

- **Emerging patterns of economic growth, trade, and demography must inform humanitarian adjustments to global transformations.**

When the Pakistan earthquake struck in October 2005, a political observer commented that "it was the largest earthquake to ever affect the United Kingdom."[3] This remark is an example of how demographic shifts—in this case the significant population of the Pakistani diaspora in the United Kingdom—can change the concept of national interests and will affect the ways that humanitarian crises will be seen in the future. The negative and positive effects of globalization must all be calculated in terms of future vulnerabilities.

- **Adequate structures do not exist to accommodate regional level crises or trends toward increasing state failure.**

Most humanitarian organizations assume that the state is at the center of crisis management, and many responders depend on governments for operational support, including visas, importation of assistance materials, and other logistical assistance. This leaves the community unprepared for a

1. See, for example, Howard W. French and Lydia Polgreen, "China, Filling a Void, Drills for Riches in Chad," *New York Times*, section. A, August 13, 2007. See also Gill et al., *China's Expanding Role in Africa*.

2. Nonstate actors came to fore of humanitarian assistance in August 2006, when Hezbollah spearheaded a rapid reconstruction program in southern Lebanon during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. See Thanassis Cambanis, "With speed, Hezbollah picks up the shovel," *Boston Globe*, section A, August 19, 2006.

3. Interview, January 30, 2007.

future in which the breakdown of formal state structures will be increasingly prevalent and disasters will transcend political boundaries.

Strategic Planning Gap

- **Strategic thinking rarely incorporates analysis of longer-term crisis drivers and does not adequately account for potential shocks that could cause humanitarian crises.**

Although there is wide agreement that emerging trends will shape future crises, only in a minority of cases did respondents suggest that their organizations had undertaken analysis of longer-term consequences. Practitioners almost universally agreed that more strategic planning *should* be pursued, but they noted a weak institutional interest—often due to a lack of dedicated funding. This attitude is compounded by the perception that reliable information on long-term trends is difficult to obtain.

- **Strategies for immediate crises are rarely developed and, where they do exist, often reflect the interests of participating institutions.**

Relief operations are rarely guided by coherent strategic objectives and tend to reflect existing resources. The UN System has had some success in instilling strategic thinking into disaster planning through the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), but the resulting objectives are typically aspirational rather than strategic. As a result, planning is often guided by what organizations *can* do rather than what organizations *should* be doing.

- **The humanitarian community lacks the incentives to act more strategically.**

In many cases, respondents felt that donor attitudes were largely responsible for the sector's poor performance in strategic planning. Donor organizations with the capacity to incentivize strategic analysis in crisis management are largely unsupportive and prefer to tie their money directly to programming. This funding structure ensures that a greater share of money directly reaches beneficiaries, but it can also undercut efforts to improve overall response efficacy. Humanitarians were nearly unanimous in their belief that changes in funding requirements would result in far more strategic analysis.

- **The community has not reckoned with the prospect of simultaneous crises.**

Considerable efforts have recently been made to address chronically neglected crises. As the dynamics of crisis evolve in the coming years, the specter of "simultaneous crises" will be equally, if not more, challenging. Simultaneous crises could include, for example, a major crisis in a developed region (e.g., an earthquake along the San Andreas Fault) in parallel with a crisis in an underdeveloped region (e.g., a major famine in East Africa), further compounded by the outset of a potentially global crisis (e.g., avian influenza). Multicrisis planning does not figure prominently in the humanitarian sector.

Operational Coherence Gap

- **Information is compartmentalized and not readily shared across the sector.**

Despite attempts at greater openness, information relevant to humanitarian crises is not automatically shared with other actors. The military's tendency to deny access to classified—but crucial—information exemplifies this trend. Surprisingly, even within the UN system, resident and humani-

tarian coordinators do not have automatic access to analysis produced by other UN agencies, and at times this information is even purposefully withheld.[4]

▪ Basic operational information is often unavailable.

Reliable information is often unavailable during crisis operations, even when there is a willingness to share it. To provide a single example, following Hurricane Katrina, no one directly involved in the response was aware of a large Japanese relief warehouse located in Florida.[5] This warehouse contained essential supplies intended to relieve hurricane-affected areas in the Caribbean, but no domestic U.S. authority was aware of its availability, and no mechanisms existed to link responders to this information.

▪ Disjointed initiatives often compound the overall lack of systemization.

Numerous initiatives for strengthening operational coherence at the international level have been implemented over the years. Recent programs include the UN cluster approach, pooled-funding mechanisms, and the restructured UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), a common fund in which public and private donors can preposition funding for rapid response and neglected emergencies. Similar efforts have been underway in the United States, with flexible funding options,[6] the creation of a civilian office focused on complex emergencies,[7] and more interagency collaboration, such as the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and now Iraq.[8] These efforts are steps in the right direction, but as initiatives proliferate without systemization, useful developments can add to overall confusion, as well as undermine interest in further cooperation.[9]

▪ "Coordination" cannot replace program management.

Complaints about the lack of coordination in humanitarian operations persist, but in many ways, this debate has run out of steam by failing to link "coordination" to clear objectives. Program management skills would go a long way to addressing coordination as a part of a larger re-evaluation of humanitarian management strategies. In general, program management—in the corporate sense of the word—remains poorly understood across the humanitarian sector.

▪ Organizations' comparative advantages are often ignored.

Disasters often trigger an urge to do *everything*, particularly among donors. Some responders are more competent than others in particular areas, and recognizing comparative advantage (especial-

4. Interview at UN Geneva headquarters, November 22, 2006.

5. Anne C. Richard, *Role Reversal: Offers of Help From Other Countries in Response to Hurricane Katrina* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2006).

6. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has long had access to flexible funding, and Congress recently approved budgets for the Department of Defense's Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which makes flexible funding available to commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan for humanitarian projects.

7. The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) was created in 2004 to lead U.S. efforts in "fragile states."

8. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are integrated civilian-military teams that are assigned reconstruction projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. For more information, see: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef-prt.htm.

9. This issue came up several times with U.S. policymakers and organizations, some of whom noted skepticism of recent UN efforts, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which they felt could not be the standard UN "trust-us" model. Interview with U.S. government official, November 20, 2006.

ly in funding decisions) could significantly strengthen operational coherence. Unfortunately, the desire of governments to earn political capital with their publics can work against this recognition, as can NGO efforts to bolster their image in the eyes of funders.

Cultural Awareness Gap

- **Responders often fail to understand the nature of crisis-affected communities.**

The perception that humanitarian interventions tend to reflect the capacities of the provider rather than the needs of recipients is commonplace, as illustrated by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition's finding that "many assessments served to justify actions already underway,"[10] rather than assess what was most needed. Although there have been important improvements in assessment methods, including a recently refined needs assessment framework circulated by the UN Consolidated Appeals Process Unit, these improvements have not been generalized at the system-wide level.[11]

- **The community must abandon the "hapless victim syndrome."**

Some responders persist in viewing crisis-affected peoples as hapless victims. In many instances, however, it is the affected community that provides the critical inputs for immediate survival—particularly during rapid-onset disasters.[12] The "hapless victim syndrome" discourages local empowerment and deprives relief efforts of local actors' contextual knowledge.

- **Current investments in local capacity building are insufficient.**

International humanitarian organizations have a poor track record in investing in local skills development, often owing to reservations about time commitments and feasibility. Although some organizations have made significant efforts, too few resources have been assigned to these projects overall. This fuels perceptions that local capacities are inherently inferior, reinforcing a cycle of "incapacitation" that ensures ongoing reliance on international response mechanisms.

Community Coherence Gap

- **Lessons are rarely ever learned across the community.**

Most operations generate postevent evaluations, but the community struggles to implement recommendations uniformly and repeatedly "learns" the same lessons. Many practitioners admitted to skepticism that their own organizations had been successful in implementing "lessons learned." This difficulty has three main sources: the ways that humanitarian operations are funded, person-

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10. Claude De Ville de Goyet and Lezlie Morinière, *Evaluation of the Adequacy, Appropriateness and Effectiveness of Needs Assessments in the International Decision-Making Process to Assist People Affected by the Tsunami: An Evaluation of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition* (Geneva: International Center for Migration and Health, 2006), http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/SriLanka/catalogue/Files/Info%20Centre/TEC/TEC_TEC_NA_final_30_January_numbrd.pdf.

11. There are exceptions, as James Darcy, Director of Humanitarian Programs at the Overseas Development Institute has noted. See World Food Programme, "Emergency Needs Assessment: Commitment to Transparency" (Rome: Operations Department Directive, 2004) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), *Strengthening Vulnerability Assessments and Analysis in the SADC Region, Through the SADC Regional Assessment Committee: A Five Year Programme* (Gaborone, Botswana, SADC, 2005).

12. Hugo Slim, "Global Welfare: A Realistic Expectation for the International Humanitarian System," *ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action* (London: ALNAP, 2006).

nel issues (including temporary contracts, insufficient training, and high turnover), and institutional dynamics.

- **Quality control is impossible to ensure across the humanitarian sector.**

Two main reasons account for the lack of quality control within the humanitarian sector. First, assessment methods are not standardized and often reflect what organizations can do, rather than what must actually be done. Second, in the absence of clearly defined objectives, there is no consistent method to evaluate operations and measure success.

- **Disagreement on central principles encourages the lack of community coherence.**

Uncertainty pervades the humanitarian sector regarding core identity issues.[13] These questions have stirred debates for at least two decades, although recent disagreements on neutrality and independence are particularly acute. One of the most intractable gaps in humanitarian response lies in defining acceptable parameters of humanitarianism. Although this study does not directly address definitional issues, they continue to be a significant factor in undermining the sector's coherence.

13. These issues include the relevance and sustainability of humanitarian principles, the instrumentalization of humanitarian assistance, and the emergence of new actors, among others.

APPENDIX B

DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE / NSPD–XX

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Enhancing U.S. Capacity for Crisis Management

Definitions

crisis: any event, natural or man-made, that overwhelms the response capacity of therelevant government(s)

crisis management: humanitarian response to natural or man-made disasters

cascading disasters: a single crisis that impacts multiple vulnerabilities, touching offseparate, related crises

SSR: security, stabilization, reconstruction

Introduction

This Directive establishes the need for the United States to recognize the threat posed to national interests by global crises and to enhance U.S. capacity for international crisis management. It mandates the recognition that future crises will increasingly be characterized by cascading disasters that do not respect national borders, and that the best strategy to confront future challenges is through effective U.S. leadership at the international level, organized through a reconstituted national and international infrastructure for crisis management.

Policy

The United States has a strong interest in ensuring the effective management of international crises, particularly given that recent studies demonstrate the increasing likelihood that such crises will affect the American homeland. Current policy divisions separating "natural" and "man-made" crises are artificial and do not reflect the ability of one type of crisis to cascade into the other. In order to fully protect U.S. interests, recent U.S. government efforts to strengthen American capacity for SSR activities through greater inter-agency coherence (*e.g.,* NSPD-44; DODD 3000.15) need to be buttressed by a revitalized commitment to broader crisis management.

The United States government will prioritize crisis management through an office housed in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) with the authority to coordinate U.S. government crisis management efforts and act as the President's chief budget and policy advisor on issues related to humanitarian response. The director of this office will be the Deputy National Security Advisor for Humanitarian Response (DNSA/HR). The DNSA/HR will participate in National Security Council (NSC) meetings as requested by the President.

Responsibilities of the Deputy National Security Advisor for Humanitarian Response

Coordination. Within the U.S. government, crises are currently managed by several different agencies and departments, representing increasingly outdated policy distinctions between man-made, natural, domestic, and international crises. In order to achieve the best possible management of future crises, a single focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen government plans for crisis management, including planning, preparation, and response, across all involved agencies; (ii) to harmonize these efforts with military plans and operations in crisis management; (iii) to ensure that U.S. efforts are collaborating with larger international crisis management infrastructure; and (iv) to include the input and assistance of interested private sector and non-governmental organizations.

Policy. The Office of the DNSA/HR is tasked with undertaking long-run planning for U.S. approaches to future crises, as well as developing government-wide policy based on this work. Planning activities will take full account of the work done in the various offices currently overseeing crisis management and will solicit their input.

In order to achieve these objectives, the Assistant to the President for Crisis Management is responsible for the following functions:

1. Ensure program and policy coordination among Departments and Agencies of the United States government in carrying out the policies set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Control Act, and other relevant laws;
2. Coordinate among the relevant U.S. government crisis management organizations: USAID, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense to identify current approaches to crisis management and identify best practices;
3. Coordinate interagency processes to identify states and regions facing major crisis vulnerabilities, as well as develop pre-event planning for U.S. assistance in the event of such crises;
4. Work across U.S. Departments and Agencies to create a single "virtual warehouse" of available emergency assistance;
5. Establish a planning cell within the Office of the DNSA/HR to identify future crisis threats and conduct long-run strategic planning;

6. Develop strategies that will improve the international crisis management architecture;
7. Coordinate U.S. efforts and planning with relevant international agencies (chiefly: UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN IASC); UN Development Program Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP BCPR), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR));
8. Incorporate regular input from private sector entities with interests in crisis management and/ or seek additional participation from corporations with relevant expertise, in conjunction with existing U.S. offices focusing on private sector participation (USAID/Global Development Alliance, Department of State/Millennium Challenge Corporation);
9. Establish a low-barrier credentialing system for crisis management non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that provide for minimum standards of experience;
10. Convene a board of credentialed NGOs that will regularly offer their reactions to U.S. government crisis management policies and practice.

Responsibilities of Other Executive Agencies and Departments

To enable the DNSA/HR to carry out the responsibilities in this directive, Executive Departments and Agencies whose programs and personnel may be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges shall:

1. Identify, develop, and provide the DNSA/HR with relevant information on capabilities and assets;
2. Continue working under their specific mandates and building on internal strengths and capabilities;
3. Build on information collected by the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) regarding current and former civilian employees skilled in crisis management, including contractors, and devise mechanisms to deploy these employees rapidly in response to crises.

Additional Responsibilities of the Department of State

In order to fully realize the capacity of the United States for crisis management, the Secretary of State shall, in addition to the responsibilities above:

1. Direct the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to advocate for the creation of an international crisis management research organization that can undertake crucial activities that many present organizations are unable to fulfill, including research on shifting global patterns and emerging crisis threats, strategic and contingency planning, and integrated early warning systems;
2. Advocate at the United Nations for the implementation of reforms suggested by the Office of the DNSA/HR under responsibility (7) above.

Additional Responsibility of the Department of Defense

In order to fully realize the capacity of the United States for crisis management, the Secretary of Defense shall, in addition to the responsibilities above:

1. Direct Department of Defense research arms (within DARPA and other DOD offices) to consider crisis management applications when reviewing private sector applications of military research and technology.

Additional Responsibility of the Director of National Intelligence

In order to ensure that relevant information reaches crisis managers in a timely fashion, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in addition to the responsibilities above:

1. Review existing classification procedures to ensure that they do not unduly hinder the flow of critical information during humanitarian response situations;
2. Ensure that this information, when it does not threaten national security, is readily shared with government, international, and non-government crisis managers.

This directive complements National Security Presidential Directive 44 (December 7, 2005).

[SIGNED]

APPENDIX C
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APPENDIX D
ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED

Responding to Catastrophes assured all interview respondents anonymity to encourage a frank discussion of problems and possible solutions. Appendix D identifies the various organizations that the study consulted during its work.

United States Government

Department of Defense

- Office of the Secretary of Defense
    - Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
    - Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense—Homeland Defense
    - Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
    - Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Department of Homeland Security

- Emergency Preparedness and Response Policy
- Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding

Department of State

- Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
- U.S. Mission to the United Nations (New York)
- U.S. Mission to the United Nations (Geneva)

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

- Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)
    - Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
    - Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM)
- Global Development Alliance (GDA)

United States Northern Command

United Nations and International Organizations

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

Disaster Resource Network (DRN Global—World Economic Forum)

Global Compact

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Office of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

- Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)

World Bank

World Economic Forum (WEF)

World Food Program (WFP)

World Health Organization (WHO)

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Corporations

American Red Cross

Business Roundtable

CARE

Center for International Disaster Information (CIDI)

Citigroup Foundation (Citigroup, Inc.)

Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy (CECP)

Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International

InterAction

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

International Rescue Committee (IRC)

International Resources Group, Ltd.

Mercy Corps

Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)

Oxfam International

Pfizer, Inc.

Refugees International

Save the Children (U.S.)

Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR)

United States Chamber of Commerce

Academic Institutions/Policy Research Organizations

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)

Georgetown University

The Henry L. Stimson Center

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

- Sloan School of Management

Tufts University

- Feinstein International Center

United States Institute of Peace

Foreign Governments

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

- Department of Humanitarian Aid

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John Ratcliffe is a United Nations volunteer working for the UN Development Program in Central African Republic. Previously he was a research associate with the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, where he was team leader for the PCR project *Responding to Catastrophes: U.S. Innovation in a Vulnerable World*. He received a B.A. in international relations and economics from the University of Toronto and completed his master's degree at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. Fluent in French and Icelandic, Mr. Ratcliffe has experience living in Canada, France, Iceland, and Israel.

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Karin von Hippel is codirector of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project. Previously, she was a senior research fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, and spent several years working for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo. In 2004 and 2005, she participated in two major studies for the UN—one on the UN Integrated Missions and the second on the UN humanitarian system. Also in 2004, she was part of a small team investigating the development potential of Somali remittances, funded by USAID. In 2002, she advised the OECD on what development cooperation can do to get at the root causes of terrorism. Since then, she has participated in numerous conferences and working groups on the subject in Africa, Europe, and North America. She also directed a project on European counterterrorist reforms, funded by the MacArthur Foundation, edited the volume, *Europe Confronts Terrorism* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), and was a member of Project Unicorn, a counterterrorism police advisory panel in London. Additional publications include *Democracy by Force* (Cambridge, 2000), which was short-listed for the Westminster Medal in Military History. She received her Ph.D. in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, her M.St. from Oxford University, and her B.A. from Yale University.