Explosive agents

Primary reference(s)

UNODA, 2014. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) Publication. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Accessed 1 December 2019.

Additional scientific description

The threat of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks is a global problem. Cheap and relatively easy to construct, IEDs can be made anywhere from a wide range of materials. Categorisation of the harm from the explosive device can be determined through its velocity (high/low). The lack of proper stockpile security of military and commercial explosives – making them susceptible to diversion into illicit hands – also presents a significant security risk (UNODA, 2014).

Metrics and numeric limits

Improvised explosive devices kill thousands of people every year, inflicting grievous physical injuries, causing dire psychological harm and spreading fear and disruption across affected communities. Their impact on the security and stability of affected States is profound: IED attacks not only hinder the political, social and economic development of a country, but also block life-saving humanitarian aid (UNODA, 2014).

Owing to their specific nature as a tool of asymmetric warfare, IEDs are produced entirely outside government oversight. Combating their covert, rough-and-ready manufacture is a particular challenge. A full and comprehensive approach to addressing IEDs has been lacking. There is only piecemeal international cooperation against the rapid and widespread transfer of knowledge on IED design, little work on controlling commercial components, and an absence of sustained attention to victim assistance.

Some relevant initiatives to address IEDs have been put in place by governments and international and regional organisations. Under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, an expert group has compiled a list of existing guidelines and best practices aimed at addressing the diversion or illicit use of materials which can be used for IEDs (UNODA, 2014).

Examples of drivers, outcomes and risk management

Strengthening vigilance and national controls: IEDs are often made with military- or commercially-sourced explosives. The General Assembly resolution calls for measures to be put in place to establish tighter controls over materials or components used for making IEDs. These controls could encompass national ammunition stockpiles and industrially produced detonators, detonating cords and industrially produced explosives, such as for mining. Relevant industry and corporations could also be encouraged to engage in the regulation of pre-cursor and prefabricated components (UNODA, 2014).

Enhancing information sharing: owing to the ad-hoc design of IEDs, there is an overriding need for States to share information on the composition and production methods of captured IEDs, including after IED attacks. The resolution underlines this necessity. Effective information sharing on IED designs and components between Member States has the potential to shorten the learning curve that military and security forces have to go through in order to identify and develop effective counter measures. Also, civilians will be protected better when effective information sharing on new IED designs leads to quicker neutralisation (UNODA, 2014).