7.3 Decentralization of DRM functions
Effective local action requires human
capacity, financial resources and
political authority. Central policy
responsibility for disaster risk
reduction must be complemented
by adequately decentralized and
layered risk management functions,
capacities and corresponding
budgets.
Across the world, central governments are quietly sharing more power with subnational actors (O’Neill, 2005). In theory, decentralization facilitates citizen participation, more engaged decision makers, more local knowledge, more resources and more accountability, but in reality, that potential may not be always realized (Scott and Tarazona, 2011 Scott, Z. and Tarazona, M. 2011. Decentralization and disaster risk reduction. Study on disaster risk reduction, decentralization and political economy analysis for UNDP contribution to the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ).
Over the past 20 years, many countries have
adopted a decentralized approach to DRM.
Most DRM functions require local-level
planning and implementation, and the HFA
itself calls for the decentralization of authority
and resources to promote community-level
disaster risk reduction. Honduras’s 2010 Law
on the National Disaster Management System,
for example, establishes decentralization as a
guiding principle, and the 2010 Philippines
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Act makes capacity strengthening of its most
decentralized administrative units a state policy
(IFRC, 2011Click here to view this GAR paper. IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). 2011. Desk review on trends in the promotion of community-based disaster risk reduction through legislation. Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). However, not all new legislation
takes this approach, such as the centralized
plan in Thailand’s 2007 Disaster Prevention
and Mitigation Act. Of the 82 countries and
territories that reported progress implementing
the HFA in 2010, as of February 2011 only 48
confirmed that local governments have legal
responsibility and budgets for DRM.
Decentralizing responsibilities can also have
negative results if local governments are
unable to assign resources or dedicated staff
with adequate technical expertise (Pelling, 2007Click here to view this GAR paper. Pelling, M. 2010. Urban governance and disaster risk reduction in the Caribbean: The experiences of Oxfam GB. Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ; ECHO, 2008. ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid department). 2008. Vulnerabilidades, capacidades y gestión de riesgo en la república del Perú. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission Humanitarian Aid department. ; Salazar, 2010. Salazar, M. 2010. El niño throws a tantrum. Tierramerica. Rome, Italy: Inter Press Service (IPS), 24 February 2010. ;
Scott and Tarazona, 2011. Scott, Z. and Tarazona, M. 2011. Decentralization and disaster risk reduction. Study on disaster risk reduction, decentralization and political economy analysis for UNDP contribution to the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). In Latin America, several
countries that have invested in decentralized
national systems of DRM for more than a
decade, such as Colombia and Nicaragua, still
struggle with inadequate local government
capacity and resources (von Hesse et al., 2008Click here to view this GAR paper. von Hesse, M., Kamiche, J. and de la Torre, C. 2008. Contribución temática de America Latina al informe bienal y evaluación mundial sobre la reducción de riesgo 2009. Contribution to the GTZ-UNDP Background Paper prepared for the 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ; Hardoy, 2010. Hardoy, J. 2010. Local disaster risk reduction in Latin America urban areas. Case studies developed for the IIED Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ).
Some 900 of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities
have mandated local committees for disaster risk
reduction, but only 14 percent implemented
emergency and contingency plans. A similar
story is seen with South Africa’s 2002 Disaster
Management Act. Although DRM is supposed
to be integrated into development planning in
most municipalities (Botha et al. Botha, D., Van Niekerk, D., Wentink, G., Tshona, T., Maartens, Y., Forbes, K., Annandale, E., Coetzee, C. and Raju, E. 2010. Disaster risk management status assessment at municipalities in South Africa. Pretoria: South African Local Government Association (SALGA). Draft report. .. Botha, D., Van Niekerk, D., Wentink, G., Tshona, T., Maartens, Y., Forbes, K., Annandale, E., Coetzee, C. and Raju, E. 2010. Disaster risk management status assessment at municipalities in South Africa. Pretoria: South African Local Government Association (SALGA). Draft report. , 2010), poor
local government capacity has severely limited
integration (IFRC, 2011. IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). 2011. Desk review on trends in the promotion of community-based disaster risk reduction through legislation. Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ; Johnson, 2011Click here to view this GAR paper. Johnson, C. 2011. Creating an enabling environment for reducing disaster risk: Recent experience of regulatory frameworks for land, planning and building. Background paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ; Scott and Tarazona, 2011. Scott, Z. and Tarazona, M. 2011. Decentralization and disaster risk reduction. Study on disaster risk reduction, decentralization and political economy analysis for UNDP contribution to the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ; Wisner et al., 2011Click here to view this GAR paper. Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. and Davis, I. 2004. At risk: Natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters. London, UK: Routledge. ).
Decentralization without supporting legislation
has also proven very challenging in countries
that have attempted it, such as Timor-Leste
(IFRC, 2011. IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). 2011. Desk review on trends in the promotion of community-based disaster risk reduction through legislation. Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). In traditionally centralized
states, decentralized systems have experienced
difficulties even after the enactment of
new laws. For example, Indonesia’s 2007
Disaster Management Act provided for
the decentralization of certain powers and
responsibilities for disaster risk reduction and
response, and each region and city was required
to create its own disaster management agencies
and committees. However, as of 2009, only 18
of the 32 provinces had established such bodies, and local government resources had not yet been allocated (Kuntjoro and Jamil, 2010Click here to view this GAR paper. Kuntjoro, I. and Jamil, S. 2010. Triple trouble in Indonesia: Strengthening Jakarta’s disaster preparedness. Singapore: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), RSIS Commentaries. ). In its self-assessment, India also reported that the devolution of power and financial resources to local authorities has been a major challenge, often hampered by state governments’ retention of control.
More attention, therefore, needs to be paid to how DRM functions are layered and tailored to local contexts. DRM activities need to be locally grounded, and responsibilities should be devolved to the local level as much as capacities allow. Not all functions need to be fully decentralized, however, and some may be more appropriately located at higher levels, with greater capacity, political weight and decision-making power. For example, central governments should provide technical, financial and policy support, and take over responsibility for DRM when local capacities are exceeded (Scott and Tarazona, 2011. Scott, Z. and Tarazona, M. 2011. Decentralization and disaster risk reduction. Study on disaster risk reduction, decentralization and political economy analysis for UNDP contribution to the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). Another approach is to build up horizontal cooperation, where strong local governments support weaker ones, particularly in countries which have a number of well-resourced and relatively independent local authorities (Box 7.2).
Click here to view this GAR paper. Box 7.2 An alternative resource mechanism – cities in China sharing human resources, experiences and finances
China has a twinning programme that transfers financial and technical support from one province or municipality to a disaster-affected area with less human and financial resources. The twinning agreement diverts 1 percent of the annual income plus technical capacity from the richer province to fund recovery projects in the poorer province for three years.
After the 2008 earthquake in China, one such programme allowed funds from Shandong Province and Shanghai Municipality to rebuild schools and hospitals in Beichuan County and Dujiangyan City to higher standards. Shandong and Shanghai also deployed staff to the newly rebuilt institutes to provide on-the-job guidance, and they invited teachers, doctors and managers to the donor provinces to receive training. Twinning provides benefits to both recipients and donors, building experience, capacities and government networks within the country or region. It provides a stable source of funding and critical capacity sharing for a number of years, and encourages longer-term partnerships and risk sharing. Twinning also helps with the increased demand for skills after a disaster, as well as building these capacities. It can be agreed on before a disaster, allowing for fast and predictable deployment during recovery. Complete decentralization of budgeting and reporting can also generate problems. Although it may ensure that spending is in line with local priorities, it almost inevitably leads to divisions with national and sector policies and programmes (Benson, 2011 Benson, C. 2011. Integrating disaster risk reduction into national development policy and practice. In: The Routledge handbook of hazards and disaster risk reduction and management, J.C. Gaillard, I. Kelman and B. Wisner, eds. London, UK: Routledge. ).. An incremental approach to decentralization (Box 7.3) may be the best alternative. Where local government capacity and resources are particularly weak, ‘deconcentration’ may be a good interim step towards the full devolution of responsibilities and functions. In Mozambique, for example, responsibility for DRM is highly centralized in the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC). Its functions, however, are implemented through deconcentrated regional offices and local committees, separate from and in parallel to the decentralized system of local administration. As disaster risk reduction has a high profile in Mozambique, these deconcentrated mechanisms are well resourced, and staff can relocate freely between central and local levels depending on needs. Given that local government capacity is weak, most risk reduction functions are undertaken by INGC staff (Scott and Tarazona, 2011 Scott, Z. and Tarazona, M. 2011. Decentralization and disaster risk reduction. Study on disaster risk reduction, decentralization and political economy analysis for UNDP contribution to the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). However, while improving effective delivery,such arrangements may in the long term undermine local government authority and capacities.Click here to view this GAR paper. Box 7.3 Towards more responsible and responsive local risk reduction
An incremental approach to decentralizing disaster risk reduction can address limited local capacities,
a primary barrier to effective local governance. Other options for addressing the problem of low
capacity are:
7.4 Strengthening accountability
Access to information on disaster risk,
particularly for the most vulnerable,
is the first step in reducing disaster
losses. Good risk governance
requires disaster-prone populations to
know their risks as well as their rights,
and a responsive and accountable
civil society engaged in constructive
dialogue with governments.
The quality of national and local governance in general, and factors such as voice and accountability in particular, influence why some countries have far higher disaster mortality and relative economic loss than others (Kahn, 2005 Kahn, M.E. 2005. The death toll from natural disasters: The role of income, geography, and institutions. Review of Economics and Statistics 87 (2): 271–284. ; Stromberg, 2007. Stromberg, D. 2007. Natural disasters, economic development, and humanitarian aid. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (3): 199–222. ; UNISDR, 2009. UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction). 2009. Global assessment report on disaster risk reduction: Risk and poverty in a changing climate. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. ).
For example, the level of corruption has a
direct and statistically significant impact on
government efficiency and the rule of law, two
key components of risk governance (Lavell et al., 2010Click here to go to GAR09 page. Lavell, C., Canteli, C., Rudiger, J. and Ruegenberg, D. 2010. Data spread sheets developed in support of the DARA 'risk reduction index: Conditions and capacities for risk reduction'. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). Corruption also affects the level
of trust that citizens have in their government,
administration and services (Rose-Ackerman, 2001. Rose-Ackerman, S. 2001. Trust, honesty, and corruption: Reflection on the state-building process. Public Policy Working Papers No. 255. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard Law School, and John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics. ; Morris and Klesner, 2010. Morris, S. and Klesner, J. 2010. Corruption and trust: Theoretical considerations and evidence from Mexico. Comparative Political Studies 43 (10): 1258–1285. ). In general,
more democratic, accountable states with more effective institutions tend to suffer lower
mortality (Anbarci et al., 2005. Anbarci, N., Escaleras, M. and Register, C.A. 2005. Earthquake fatalities: The interaction of nature and political economy. Journal of Public Economics 89 (9–10): 1907–1933. ; Escaleras et al., 2007. Escaleras, M., Anbarci, N. and Register, C.A. 2007. Public sector corruption and major earthquakes: A potentially deadly interaction. Public Choice 132 (1–2): 209–230. ).. If it is true that ‘political survival lies at the heart of disaster politics’ (Smith and Quiroz Flores, 2010 Smith, A. and Quiroz Flores, A. 2010. Disaster politics: Why earthquakes rock democracies less. Foreign Affairs (15 July 2010). ), then accountability mechanisms are
particularly important in generating political
and economic incentives for disaster risk
reduction. The risk of being held to account
for decisions that result in avoidable disaster
risk can be a powerful incentive to make DRM
work.Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66494/alastair-smith-and-alejandro-quiroz-flores/disaster-politics. In DRM, as in many development sectors, establishing accountability is not straightforward (Olson et al., 2011 Olson, R. Sarmiento Prieto and J. Hoberman, G. 2011. Disaster risk reduction, public accountability, and the role of the media: Concepts, cases and conclusions. Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). Making direct attribution
and tracking of responsibility is complicated
by having multiple actors involved in the
construction of any specific risk. Outcomes of
any one actor’s decisions and actions may not
become visible until years or decades later, and
inaction or symbolic actions may have greater effects than decisions and actions actually taken. Moreover, the dynamics of accountability in any single context are subject to the historical evolution of regulation and governance, of cultural values and social norms.Click here to view this GAR paper. Nevertheless, there are examples where direct responsibility for action and inaction is monitored, and bearing personal responsibility for disaster losses can provide a powerful incentive for investing in DRM. Indonesia has enacted legislation that makes leaders directly responsible for disaster losses, and in Colombia the decentralization of DRM responsibilities has meant that mayors have been imprisoned when people were found to have died needlessly from a disaster (Scott and Tarazona, 2011 Scott, Z. and Tarazona, M. 2011. Decentralization and disaster risk reduction. Study on disaster risk reduction, decentralization and political economy analysis for UNDP contribution to the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ).Click here to view this GAR paper. Access to information is a key factor that drives accountability (World Bank, 2010b World Bank. 2010b. Natural hazards, unnatural disasters: The economics of effective prevention. Washington DC, USA: The World Bank and United Nations. ; Gupta, 2011. Gupta, M. 2011. Filling the governance ‘gap’ in disaster risk reduction. Background Paper prepared by the Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN) and for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). However, access to information is only effective when governments actively support the right to information, and when citizens are aware of their legal right and are willing to assert it. In addition, structural barriers, such as illiteracy, may impede access to and use of information (Gupta, 2011Click here to view this GAR paper. Gupta, M. 2011. Filling the governance ‘gap’ in disaster risk reduction. Background Paper prepared by the Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN) and for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ).Click here to view this GAR paper. The 1883 explosion of Krakatoa, Indonesia, followed the introduction of the telegram, and so became the first globally reported disaster (Winchester, 2003 Winchester, S. 2003. Krakatoa: The day the world exploded: August 27, 1883. New York, USA: HarperCollins. ). Today, most disasters are broadcast around the world in real time, through television, radio, print media, mobile social networking and the Internet. The media, therefore, plays an increasingly important role in holding governments, NGOs, international organizations and other stakeholders to account (Olson et al., 2011. Olson, R. Sarmiento Prieto and J. Hoberman, G. 2011. Disaster risk reduction, public accountability, and the role of the media: Concepts, cases and conclusions. Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). This applies only when the media is free and, more importantly, responsive to disaster risk reduction perspectives, which means it looks beyond the images of catastrophe and body counts, and reports on of the causes and longer-term impacts of disasters (Radford and Wisner, 2011Click here to view this GAR paper. Radford, T. and Wisner, B. 2011. Media, communication and disaster. In Handbook of hazards and disaster risk reduction. B. Wisner, J.C. Gaillard and I. Kelman, eds. London, UK: Routledge (in press). ; Wisner et al., 2011. Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. and Davis, I. 2004. At risk: Natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters. London, UK: Routledge. ).. The media play four different roles in the wake of disasters: observing and reporting facts such as mortality rates and the volume of assistance provided, holding governments and humanitarian actors to account, analysing the causes of the disaster and raising public awareness about potential improvements in DRM (Olson et al., 2011 Olson, R. Sarmiento Prieto and J. Hoberman, G. 2011. Disaster risk reduction, public accountability, and the role of the media: Concepts, cases and conclusions. Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). Importantly, and given its global reach, the media can help create political incentives not just in the disaster-affected country, but in other countries with similar risks. As Box 7.4 shows, after the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, media outlets in Jamaica and Peru paid increased attention to their own risks, highlighting the concern that ‘it could happen here’ (Olson et al., 2011Click here to view this GAR paper. Olson, R. Sarmiento Prieto and J. Hoberman, G. 2011. Disaster risk reduction, public accountability, and the role of the media: Concepts, cases and conclusions. Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ).Click here to view this GAR paper. Box 7.4 The role of the media following the 2010 Haiti and Chile earthquakes Evidence suggests that a culture of social accountability, and specific mechanisms to ensure it, can directly improve the effectiveness of governance and service delivery (Acharya, 2010 Acharya, B. 2010. Social accountability in DRM – drawing lessons from social audit of MGNREGS. Case study prepared for Gupta, 2011 ; Daikoku, 2010 Gupta, M. 2011. Filling the governance ‘gap’ in disaster risk reduction. Background Paper prepared by the Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN) and for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. , the Asian Disaster Reduction and Response (ADRRN)–SEEDS background paper to the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR.Click here to view this GAR paper. Click here to view this GAR paper. Daikoku, L. 2010. Citizens for clean air, New York. Case study prepared for the ADRRN Background Paper to the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). Algeria’s 2004 Law on the Prevention of Major Risks and on Disaster Management in the Framework of Sustainable Development now guarantees citizens a right to information about the risks and vulnerabilities of their places of residence and work, and whether there are measures in place to reduce risks and manage disasters (IFRC, 2011Click here to view this GAR paper. IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). 2011. Desk review on trends in the promotion of community-based disaster risk reduction through legislation. Background Paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR. ). Likewise, Serbia’s 2009 Law on Emergency Situations and El Salvador’s 2005 Law on Civil Protection, Prevention and Mitigation of Disasters, acknowledge citizens’ right to be informed on disaster risks and oblige authorities to provide this information. However, in other countries information on disaster losses and impacts is not always made public.Click here to view this GAR paper. Whereas such laws are important, they do not necessarily strengthen actual accountability unless they are supported by penalties and/or effective performance-based rewards. For example, provisions in legislation and the regulation of public office can specify the liabilities of politicians and government leaders, becoming more effective when linked to expenditure and budgets. Transparent contractual arrangements between government departments and between government and private service providers also contribute to increased accountability. Where rights and obligations are clearly articulated and tied to concrete performance measures, service delivery can improve dramatically (Box 7.5). Box 7.5 Social audits to ensure accountability in rural employment in India
India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) facilitates accountability by both
governments and civil society. It includes decentralized planning and implementation, proactive
disclosures and mandatory social audits of all projects. The impetus was provided by strong political
will and a committed high-level bureaucracy. In 2006, the Strategy and Performance Innovation Unit
(SPIU) of the Department of Rural Development, collaborated with MKSS, a civil society organization
in Rajasthan that pioneered social auditing in India, to train officials and civil society activists and to
design and conduct pilot social audits. This process trained 25 civil society resource persons at the
state level, complemented by 660 more at the district level, with audits conducted by educated youth
volunteers identified and trained by this pool of expertise.
Since the first social audit was conducted in July 2006, an average of 54 social audits have been conducted every month across all 13 NREGA districts. Whether audits have resulted in improved accountability in service delivery needs to be researched, but significant and lasting impacts are already evident, including improvements in citizens’ awareness levels, their confidence and self-respect, and importantly, their ability to engage with local officials. NOTE 1 For more information, refer to www.sc.gov.cn/zt_sczt/zhcjmhxjy/cjjy/kjcj/200912/t20091217_871603.shtml and www.sc.gov.cn/zt_sczt/zhcjmhxjy/dkzy/sf/200912/t20091201_859811.shtml |
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GAR 2011 Contributing Papers Acharya, B. 2010. Social accountability in DRM – drawing lessons from social audit of MGNREGS. Case study prepared for Gupta, 2011, the Asian Disaster Reduction and Response (ADRRN)–SEEDS. [View]Archer, D. and Boonyabancha, S. 2010. Seeing a disaster as an opportunity, harnessing the energy of disaster survivors for change. Case study prepared for the IIED Background Paper and GAR11. [View] Daikoku, L. 2010. Citizens for clean air, New York. Case study prepared for the ADRRN. [View] Gupta, M. 2011. Filling the governance ‘gap’ in disaster risk reduction. Paper prepared by the Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN). [View] Herranz, P. Human rights and accountability. Case study prepared for the ADRRN. [View] Ievers, J. and Bhatia, S. 2011. Recovery as a catalyst for reducing risk. IRP. [View] IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). 2011. Desk review on trends in the promotion of community-based disaster risk reduction through legislation. [View] Karayalcin, C. and Thompson, P. 2010. Decision-making constraints on the implementation of viable disaster risk reduction projects. Some perspectives from economics. [View] Llosa, S. and Zodrow, I. 2011. Disaster risk reduction legislation as a basis for effective adaptation. [View] Olson, R. Sarmiento Prieto and J. Hoberman, G. 2011. Disaster risk reduction, public accountability, and the role of the media: Concepts, cases and conclusions. . [View] Satterthwaite, D. 2011. What role for low-income communities in urban areas in disaster risk reduction? . [View] Scott, Z. and Tarazona, M. 2011. Decentralization and disaster risk reduction. Study on disaster risk reduction, decentralization and political economy analysis for UNDP contribution to the GAR11. [View] Williams, G. 2011. The political economy of disaster risk reduction. Study on Disaster Risk Reduction, Decentralization and Political Economy Analysis for UNDP contribution to the GAR11. [View] |
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